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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
When the US-led coalition invaded Iraq on 19 March 2003 it marked the end of 
Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian Ba’ath regime and the tentative beginnings of the so 
called ‘new Iraq’ (Rogg and Rimscha 2007). The new Iraq was to be based on 
democratic values and was to move forward united and away from the previous 
decades of oppression and internal division. However, a quick glance back at the first 
11 years of the new Iraq’s history shows a country in deep crisis. Ethno-religious 
tensions have flourished, developing sectarian mistrust and severe hostility, leaving 
the country at the brink of a total breakdown. Iraq is currently in a serious crisis 
threatening its mere existence. 
Lederach argues that after a civil war, a nation needs to be restored - materially, but 
also to a high extent relationally (1997, p.24). Whether the three and a half decades of 
authoritarian and repressive rule of Saddam Hussein can be classified as a civil war is 
contestable, however, the main argument here is that post-Saddam Hussein Iraq 
needed to be restored - materially and relationally. As tensions between the different 
ethno-religious groups in Iraq grew more and more hostile after 2003, political 
attention grew on the matter that a national reconciliation was indispensable if Iraq 
was to escape the shade of past decades of repression and systematic violence from 
the regime. Two different national reconciliation processes were initiated, by the Arab 
League in November 2005 and al-Malaki’s government in 2006 respectively, however 
both had very limited - if any - positive impact on national reconciliation (al-Marashi 
and Keskin 2008). Al-Marashi and Keskin (2008) argue how sectarian divisions and 
mistrust between the three main ethno-religious groups in Iraq - a consequence of 
Saddam Hussein and his brutal and discriminating Sunni muslim Ba’ath regime - 
became an obstacle for the acceptance of the two reconciliation initiatives. The Arab 
League was by the Shia majority and the Kurdish minority perceived to favour Sunni 
interests and therefore the Arab League reconciliation initiative was rejected (Ibid. 
p.250-253). Similarly, the reconciliation initiative by al-Maliki’s predominantly Shia 
dominated government was rejected as too pro-Shia by the Sunni minority in Iraq 
(Ibid. p.253-256).    
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Hence, according to al-Marashi and Keskin’s (2008) analysis of the 2005/6 national 
reconciliation attempts, the role - or maybe rather the specific character - of the third 
party was a crucial factor for the failure of the two national reconciliation initiatives. 
However, many different factors influence and affect national reconciliation 
processes. Linzer (2007) for instance argue that external factors - e.g. neighbouring 
countries - also can play an important role in the success or failure of national 
reconciliation processes. Furthermore, internal demographics and power relations, 
even natural resources, can serve as factors affecting the national move towards 
reconciliation (Zubaida 2012, Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009). National reconciliation 
processes are thus affected by a substantial range of different factors.  
As this study will argue, justice is at the core of reconciliation (Amstutz 2005). More 
specifically, it will be argued that the Iraqi ethno-religious groups’ perception of 
whether certain social, political and/or economical developments and initiatives are 
just or unjust further affects national reconciliation. A perception of being treated 
unjust will have negative implications for the movement towards reconciliation, as 
such perception breeds sectarian mistrust and, as will be shown, further ethno-
religious tension (Haddad 2013).   
Against this backdrop this study will analyse and interpret the constitutional 
negotiations of 2005 in order to investigate the extent the ethno-religious groups’ 
perception of justice affected national reconciliation processes. We thus seek to 
answer the following research question:    
 
How have the different ethno-religious groups in Iraq perceived the making of 
the 2005 constitution as just or unjust - and to what extent has that affected 
the national reconciliation processes? 
 
To answer this research question five different components will be explored. First, a 
general discussion about what justice is will lay the foundation for the further 
investigation. Second, the concept of reconciliation is explored with a main focus on 
what type or understanding of justice the concept presupposes. Third, the Iraqi 
context will be accounted for, before, an interpretation of the constitutional 
negotiations is undertaken. Finally, a discussion of our findings is presented.   
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1.2 Concepts  
A few concepts are of importance for this study and below a clarification of these will 
follow.  
 
• Justice: Throughout this project no set definition of justice is applied. 
Consequently, justice can be approached from many perspectives. Several of 
these will be explored further below, e.g., retributive justice, restorative justice 
and relational justice. In this study the primary concern is with the process of 
achieving a just result rather than stating what such a result might be.  
 
• Reconciliation: Throughout this project report the concept of reconciliation is 
understood as both a process and an end goal. Understood as a process, it 
implies two opposing parties moving towards each other (again) - the act of 
reconciling - whereas understood as an end goal, reconciliation is a certain 
state of relational equality (Skaar, Gloppen, and Suhrke 2005). As, 
reconciliation has no static goal, but rather the aim of maintaining equality in 
relationships (Llewellyn & Philpott 2014).  
 
• Ethno-religious groups: In this study the term is used as a way of categorising 
the Iraqi population based on ethnicity and religion. Despite the existence of 
numerous different ethno-religious groups in Iraq this study’s use of the term 
specifically refers to the three main groups, namely, the Arab Shia Muslims, 
the Arab Sunni Muslim and the Kurds.  
 
1.3 Methods and methodology 
The following pages will contain an account for and reflection on the methodological 
framework and methods this project builds upon and an ethical consideration at the 
end. The choice and application of the theoretical framework, empirical data, and the 
analytical strategy will be considered together with a critical reflection of the 
consequences and implications of these choices. However, before looking into these 
some time will be spent accounting for some epistemological and ontological 
considerations relevant for this study. 
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Epistemological and ontological considerations 
This study will explore and account for how the Iraqi ethno-religious groups have 
perceived the process of negotiating the 2005 constitution as just, and how this 
perception have affected the national reconciliation processes. It is thus at this 
preliminary stage important to establish what we can actually know and how we can 
know in regards to this study on the Iraqi ethno-religious groups, justice, and 
prospects of national reconciliation.  
These epistemological and ontological considerations are building on the main 
premise that an interpretandum - concept, text, object, etc. - is “ ...not an ‘object out 
there’ independent of its interpretations and capable of serving as an arbiter of true 
correctness. The interpretandum is not simply there, its true nature waiting to be 
discovered: it must be constructed in the process of reading.” (Connolly and Keutner 
1988, p. 17). This argument is based on the hermeneutical tradition and in particular 
the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer (e.g. Gadamer 1959, 2004, Connolly and Keutner 
1988, Delanty and Strydom 2003), which also serves as the epistemological 
foundation of this study. So, understanding a given concept (or object, text, etc), such 
as the Iraqi ethno-religious groups’ understanding of justice in a given situation, thus 
involves the act of interpretation as this world’s interpretandos are not just objects 
‘out there’ in themselves, available for us to just pick up and all understand 
equivalently. This statement tells us something about two interlinked matters, namely 
the nature of interpretandos and the nature and characteristics of the researcher.  
First, turning to considerations about the characteristics of the researcher - as this also 
sheds light to the understanding of the nature of things - the hermeneutical stance 
stands in contrast to the positivist observer’s value free objectivism. The 
hermeneutical researcher is not value free, but rather very much framed by his or her 
history, culture, values and context. This personal standpoint, values and conceptions, 
is what the researcher meets the interpretandum with. This is what Gadamer describes 
as an researcher’s prejudices or pre-opinions (1959) and that shapes the researcher’s 
understanding of the given interpretandum. These prejudices - despite the negative 
resonance of the concept - are, however, by Gadamer not merely regarded negative 
and limiting for interpretation and understanding (Connolly and Keutner 1988, p. 27). 
On the contrary, prejudices are what makes possible an interpretation and 
understanding of a given interpretandum, whether the subject matter might be an 
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object, concept, or text. Accounting for Gadamer’s view, Connolly and Keutner 
claims “... the prejudice- (or circle-) structure of understanding makes it possible in 
the first place for us even to begin to comprehend a text…” (1988, p. 27). However, 
this is not without implications, because “...although our effort is directed to seeing 
with the eyes of the text, the very prejudices which enable us to make the attempt 
ensure that our success will always remain partial, that the eyes through which we 
look will always remain our own.” (Connolly and Keutner 1988, p. 28-29). This 
consideration, however, does not merely say something about the researcher but also 
informs about the hermeneutical ontological stance. What we can know about the 
world - or the interpretandum to stay in the vocabulary used above - is always only an 
interpretation from our point of view and builds on the prejudices we hold.   
One must thus meet the text, concept or object of study “...aware of one’s own bias, 
so that the text presents itself in its otherness and in this manner has the chance to 
play off its truth in the matter at hand against the interpreter’s pre-opinion.” (Gadamer 
1959, p.73).  Therefore, despite the researcher’s bias, pre-opinion and prejudices the 
hermeneutical researcher, aware of his or her prejudices and bias, must let the 
interpretandum present itself and challenge his or her prejudices. “...’[A] real fusing 
of horizons’ occurs in such a way that a ‘higher universality that overcomes our own 
particularity but also that of the other’, ‘something of living value’ for the future, 
ensues.” (Delanty and Strydom 2003, p. 94). However, this not a single act but a 
continuing and repeated process (Gadamer 1959, p.77). Thus, “to understand means 
primarily to understand [oneself in] the subject matter.” (Gadamer 1959, p.75).    
 
In concrete terms the insights of Gadamer have had implications for how we came to 
understand the interpretandum - the Iraqi ethno-religious groups’ perception of 
justice. We initially approached the selected empirical data (which will be further 
introduced below) with our prejudices, certain horizon and basic understanding of the 
matter. This first ‘meeting’ with the empirical body of literature - and thus different 
interpretations of the Iraqi ethno-religious groups and their perception of the 
constitutional negotiations - revised our initial prejudices and challenged our 
horizons. With these revised prejudices and challenged horizons we approached the 
interpretandum again, and thus obtained a deeper/better understanding of the Iraqi 
understanding of justice (Delanty and Strydom 2003, p.94).  This circle- or 
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prejudice structure of understanding (Connolly and Keutner 1988, p.27-28) can 
theoretically continue, each time refining the understanding of the Iraqi ethno-
religious groups and their perception of the constitutional negotiations. “Filtering out 
the true meaning contained in a text or an artistic creation is, incidentally, itself an 
unending process.” (Gadamer 1959, p.77). Each text of the body of texts making up 
our set of empirical data, thus enabled us to understand another text deeper, which 
accordingly shed clearer light on another and back on the initial text. It is thus a 
moving back and forth between the texts, allowing them become tools of 
interpretation.      
 
On a somewhat different note, before moving to an account for the choice and 
application of the theoretical framework, empirical data, and the analytical strategy, a 
short ethical consideration should be raised. This is in regards to the ethics of 
representation - and in this case representing the different Iraqi ethnic-religious 
groups and their perception of justice in the constitutional negotiations. We do not 
claim ourselves to be in a position able to represent the Iraqi people and their 
understanding of justice - this is a task only in the hands of the different Iraqi people 
themselves. So, as outsiders of the Iraqi people and culture, we refrain from any 
claims of being in a position able to represent the understanding of justice as it is 
perceived by the Iraqis themselves. Instead, however, we merely claim to be 
accounting for the perception of justice in the constitutional negotiations as it is 
interpreted - on the basis of our given prejudices - from the chosen empirical data, 
which will be accounted for below.  
 
Furthermore, when we talk about the different ethno-religious groups in Iraq and their 
perception of justice, a clarification should be made, and precaution taken. We do not 
wish to portrayed these groups as being homogeneous groups with a distinct and 
single voice or perception of justice. In reality this is not the case.  
In determining the boundaries of a group, several issues should be considered. Crucial 
issues of consideration are the place of birth, ethnicity, religion, and sense of 
belonging. Does someone belong to a certain group because he or she is born into it, 
or holds a certain religion, or is group membership rather dependent on where 
someone feels he or she belongs? Is group membership something that is 
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subjectively determined by each individual, or is it more objectively determined by 
outsiders? All these considerations can be argued to be the case, depending on how 
matters are perceived (Chaitin, Linstroth & Hiller  2009). It is thus contestable and 
complicated to argue someone belong to this certain group and not to the other. 
Further, to assign certain perceptions of reality and understandings of things to certain 
groups, can also be seen as a simplification of reality (Banks 1996). However, a 
simplification and categorisation of reality is inevitable for the purpose of study 
(Chaplin 2006).    
For the sake of conducting an analysis on how the perception of justice in the making 
of the 2005 constitution, it has been deemed necessary to categorise the Iraqi 
population in different groups. The categorisation of the Iraqi population has been 
based on ethnicity and religion. However, as argued above, place of birth, ethnicity, 
and/or religion are not necessarily the factors, which determine the social group one 
belong to or feel part of (Banks 1996). There are no objective clear cut groups in any 
society, as this is closely linked to the perception of reality and knowledge, but for 
analytical reasons, here ethnicity and religion serves as determinators of group 
membership. 
Consequently, this inevitable leads to the issue of representation in regards to the 
individual’s sense of belonging. As we determine the divide of the population into 
different groups, it creates a situation where individuals might not feel they belong in 
that certain group, or that their understandings and perceptions are being represented 
by the group. If one’s opinions are not reflected in the group’s opinion, one might not 
feel as part of it. This means that a person can be classified as part of one group - here 
determined by ethnicity and religion - without him or her feeling as part of it. This we 
acknowledge is a rather important issue, and further recognise this will have 
implications for the validity of our conclusions. However, despite the issues and 
problems, we for the purpose of this study have regarded an ethno-religious 
categorisation of the Iraqi population as the most suitable for the scope of this study.  
 
Choice and application of theoretical framework and its consequences 
The theoretical framework applied in this project falls in two main categories. First, 
there are theories regarding the understanding of justice and, second, the concept of 
reconciliation. The different literature for both main categories were retrieved 
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simultaneously using literature search engines, such as SCOPUS, ProQuest, 
SocINDEX, etc. Furthermore, the search engine at Roskilde University Library was 
also used to find books on the particular fields of research.   
The process of retrieving literature that would form the foundation of the analytical 
framework can be described as a sequential process (Bryman 2012, p.418), where 
every search somewhat builds on the information added to our knowledge by the 
previous search. The retrieving of literature thus evolved somewhat like a rolling 
snowball - sequentially growing in size and/or extent (Bryman 2012, p. 424). Initially, 
keywords such as ‘Iraq AND reconciliation’ and ‘reconciliation’ and ‘Iraq’ were used 
in the search engines mentioned above. Different filters were further used to delimit 
the number of search results and to enhance their relevance, for instance only peer-
reviewed academic journal articles and books from recognised publishers were 
considered.    
The results from these initial searches formed the basis of the theoretical framework 
and opened up for new directions to explore. In particular one article by al-Marashi 
and Keskin (2008) was in the early stages of the literature search important in steering 
the further direction. Al-Marashi and Keskin argue in the article that the different 
Iraqi ethnic groups’ distrust in the non-partialness of the facilitating third party played 
an important factor in the rejection (or at least the lack of serious approval and 
support) of the two 2005/6 reconciliation initiatives in Iraq. This raised for us the 
question if other factors similarly could (either positively or negatively) affect 
reconciliation attempts. In addition, Llewellyn and Philpott (2014) argue that 
reconciliation presupposes a relational conception of justice and against the backdrop 
of that argument, the search was steered in the direction of understandings of justice 
and their compatibility with the concept of reconciliation. A new round of literature 
search was conducted, where keywords such as ‘justice’, ‘justice AND 
reconciliation’, ‘culture AND justice’, and ‘justice AND Iraq’ shaped the search.     
 
From the retrieved literature the theoretical framework was shaped. First, in order to 
fully comprehend Llewellyn and Philpott’s (2014) argument of reconciliation 
presupposing a relational understanding of justice, a theoretical framework to 
understand the concept of justice was shaped. At the core of understanding 
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reconciliation is the understanding of justice (Amstutz 2005). Therefore, the 
theoretical framework entails an introduction of the concept.  
However, as for instance Berry, Poortinga and Pandey (1997) argue, a society’s 
understandings and perceptions of reality is shaped by culture and history. Therefore, 
the theoretical framework also explores how culture and history influences a society’s 
understanding of justice. Against this backdrop Islamic understandings of justice was 
also added to the theoretical framework. Due to Iraq’s long history with Islam, the 
Islamic understanding of justice is an important aspect that must be considered 
(Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009).   
To further understand Llewellyn and Philpott’s (2014) argument that reconciliation 
encompasses a relational conception of justice, two often contradictory accounts of 
justice, namely retributive and restorative justice, are introduced. These two variants 
of justice lie at the center of the discussions surrounding reconciliation and are 
important to understand Llewellyn and Philpott’s (2014) argument. Retributive and 
relational justice are in the academic literature traditionally opposing positions when 
discussing for and against reconciliation. Llewellyn and Philpott (2014) attempts with 
their relational conception of justice to move beyond this distinction and into a more 
relational and holistic conception of justice that is presupposed by reconciliation and 
not entails a complete national amnesia.     
 
Choice and selection of empirical data and its consequences 
The empirical data employed in this study refers to the body of literature applied in 
the analysis of the ethno-religious groups’ perception of justice in the making of the 
2005 Iraqi constitution. The empirical data we use are secondary sources and the body 
of empirical data is somewhat diverse, however it is qualitative in nature and selected 
on the basis of certain criteria. Search engines such as SUMMON and ProQuest was 
used when searching for empirical data for all three groups, however as different data 
was needed for the three different ethno-religious groups, data was searched for using 
keywords specific for the different groups. The keywords for empirical literature on 
the Arab Sunnis was ‘Iraq constitution’, ‘Sunnis in Iraq’. For the Arab Shia group 
keywords such as ‘Shia Iraq’, ‘Shia’, and ‘Shia Iraq AND constitution’. Lastly, for the 
Kurds keywords such as ‘Kurds AND Iraq’, ‘Kurds AND Constitution’, and ‘Kurds’ 
were used to retrieve the empirical data.  
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As each search resulted in a large number of hits, certain criteria was used to select 
the most relevant texts. First, a main selection criteria was that the texts had to be 
peer-reviewed journal articles. Further, the texts had an analysis on either the entire 
constitution and drafting process or at least an analysis on parts of it. Eight texts were 
chosen for the analysis of the Arab Sunnis - namely, al-Marashi (2005), al-Sheikh and 
Sky (2011),  Barkey and Laipson (2005), Chaplin (2006), Cetinsaya (2007), Katzman 
(2008), Sarkin and Sensibaugh (2009)  and McGarry & O’Leary (2007). For the Arab 
Shia group four texts was selected, Cole, Katzman, Sadjadpour, and Takeyh (2005), 
Schmidt (2008), Chaplin (2006), and Stansfield (2005). Lately, for the analysis on the 
Kurds five text was also chosen - namely, Rogg and Rimscha (2007), Stansfield and 
Anderson (2009), al-Marashi (2005), and Chaplin (2006).  
       
Choice and application of analytical strategy and its consequences 
A case study design has been chosen in this study, as it enables to conduct a 
“...detailed and intensive analysis of a single case.” (Bryman 2012 p.66). The 
constitutional negotiations and process of drafting a new constitution for the ‘new 
Iraq’ after the downfall of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath regime is the case to be 
analysed here. However, as encaptured by our research question, the case study has a 
particular focus, namely on the three different ethno-religious groups and their 
particular perception of whether the process was just or not and how this has affected 
the national reconciliation processes. Whether this case study actually “...exemplifies 
a broader category of which it is a number” (Ibid., p. 70) can be contested. In other 
words, the Iraqi case can be argued to be so unique - both in the sense of the ethno-
religious composition of the population and the complexities of the historical context 
- that it is contested whether the conclusions of this study can shed much light to other 
cases. So, the conclusions of this study cannot be regarded as generalised conclusions 
representing the broader category of these countries. Conclusions for each country 
must thus be drawn on the basis of specific case study of each country, taking the 
historical context and demographic composition into consideration.      
 
Further, the analysis of the case has been conducted using a content analysis of the 
empirical texts. As an analytical method, content analysis allows for an analysis of 
data that may vary in form, length and format, and further proves an attractive 
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method for research where empirical fieldwork may prove very difficult or impossible 
(Bryman 2012, p. 304). The body of empirical literature chosen here varies in many 
instances, however, analysing the content of the texts, using the theoretical framework 
as a tool to detect issues of importance, has enabled us to extract the data needed. This 
has been done in a manner that two main themes from the theory - namely, history 
and equality along with its sub-themes - marginalisation, representation and 
distribution have been used as analytical themes. These choices have been made in 
order to detect the three ethno-religious groups’ perception of justice from the chosen 
empirical data. However, it is understood that these two themes are very 
interconnected and thus in some sense artificial. Although, we are using two different 
analytical main themes, in reality they are strongly influenced by one another. 
Additionally, it is important to mention that the history theme in the analysis only 
deals with issues relevant to constitution making and not general history of Iraq, since 
the context chapter accounts for that. On the other hand, the empirical literature have 
not been produced with a research question similar to the one of this study, the 
analysis of the texts becomes a matter of interpretation and reading between the lines. 
This can arguably be viewed as contestable, however, in the light of interpretivism, as 
discussed further above, it proves a suitable method.  
   
1.4 Project outline 
Having set the stage, the remaining of this study will be structured as following. First, 
in chapter two, a theoretical foundation will be laid. Initially, theory on the concept of 
justice will be explored as this will enhance the understanding of the concept of 
reconciliation. The concept of reconciliation is, as it will be shown, very much tied up 
to the concept of justice and the remaining of chapter two will explore the theory of 
reconciliation and the relationship between reconciliation and justice, before finally 
accounting for the relational conception of justice that reconciliation presupposes.   
Chapter three will contain an introduction to the Iraqi context, and will be further 
‘setting the stage’ before moving into the analytical part. This will be the task of 
chapter four, which will be interpretive and analytical in nature, as the Iraqi ethno-
religious groups’ perception of justice in the making of the constitution and the effects 
this had on national reconciliation processes will be analysed.  
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In the fifth chapter, the findings are discussed in relation to the relational conception 
of justice presupposed in the concept of reconciliation. On the basis of this discussion 
we, in the sixth and final chapter, will draw up the main findings and conclusions of 
this study, while also placing these in the current broader academic discussions.   
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
Reconciliation is an important part of peacebuilding in post-conflict states. 
Furthermore, as this chapter will explore reconciliation is highly dependent on the 
concept of justice. The two concepts, reconciliation and justice, play thus a 
fundamental role in the transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy, as well as 
minimising the risk of a recurrence of conflict (Pankhurst 1999, Llewellyn 
and  Philpott 2014). 
This chapter will thus identify the theoretical understanding(s) of reconciliation and 
justice in relation to peacebuilding in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The first part of this 
chapter will introduce the concept of justice with a focus on issues of contextual 
relevance. Hence, in the context of Iraq, the influence of culture and Islamic theology 
on the perception of justice is explored. The second part of this chapter explores the 
concept of reconciliation, first understood as an end goal, then different views on 
reconciliation as a process. Lastly, this chapter, building on Llewellyn and Philpott 
(2014), will introduce a more holistic approach to reconciliation.   
 
2.2 Justice  
“Justice means that people get what they are entitled to, or deserve, on the basis of 
who they are and what they have done.” (Mikula 2001, p. 8063). As straightforward 
and unambiguous Mikula’s definition of justice here may seem, it is only so at the 
abstract level. In concrete terms the “...definition is open to multiple translations…” 
(Ibid.) and reality soon proves it evident that no universal consensus on what justice is 
exists. Still, as Montada notes, “[w]e speak of justice in the singular as if there were 
only one just solution for any problem.” (2001, p. 8037). In reality, though, justice - 
interdependent on a range of different contentious concepts and matters - is a 
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controversial concept to universally define. Reality (circumstances, history, religion, 
culture, etc.) has a huge impact on how different people, nations and societies 
understand justice. However, complexing matter further, “[e]ven if views of justice 
are socially shared, this does not change the basically subjective nature of judgments 
of justice and injustice.” (Mikula 2001, p. 8063). Consequently, defining justice - 
even at the national or society level - is contestable and complex. The following will 
thus not be an attempt to ultimately define the concept of justice - neither in universal 
terms nor specifically Iraqi. Rather, what follows will explore certain theoretical 
aspects and components of the concept of justice relevant for this study on how ethno-
religious groups' perception of justice in the making of the 2005 constitution affected 
national reconciliation processes. First, however, a short introduction to different key 
concepts that to varying degree influence the perception of what justice is.  
 
Culture’s influence on shaping an understanding of justice 
Contrary to the predominant understandings of natural science, prevailing schools of 
social science perceive human behaviors and understandings as socially constructed. 
Although existing for centuries, the understanding has gained more ground in the last 
decades (Berry, Poortinga and Pandey 1997). The influence culture has on 
perceptions and behavior is on most occasions inevitable. “[W]e humans are all 
ethnocentric. This is a fundamental reality, reflecting that we all grow up in a specific 
culture (even when it is cosmopolitan and a mixture of other cultures) and learn to 
believe that the standards, principles, perspectives, and expectations that we acquire 
from our culture are the way to look at the world.” (Ibid., p. ix).  
 
Based on the arguments above, the idea that culture influences us in numerous ways 
cannot be overlooked. “A number of investigators have proposed that differences in 
social structure and social practice underlie differences in perception.” (Richard, 
Nisbett and Miyamoto 2005). Subsequently, the cultural differences affect even the 
ethical decision-makings of an individual or a society as a whole (Vitell, Nwachukwu 
and Barnes 1993). Culture thus has a strong impact on the understanding of justice, 
both at personal and societal level.  
Authors have also argued that different aspects within the concept of justice are also 
socially constructed and thus affected by culture and social interactions.  This 
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strengthens the argument that justice and the understanding of it, is being influenced 
by different cultures. While it is argued that justice is constructed, some authors do 
argue that even international law cannot be universally given, but merely a set of laws 
made by a particular class in a particular group of nations who most often than not, 
share some common or familiar cultural roots and united by religion, ideology or 
culture (Focarelli 2012). Justice is thus no universal given truth, but rather a social 
construct, shaped by a society’s culture and history.  
 
Religion’s influence on shaping an understanding of justice 
Iraq is a multi-ethnic society comprised of different sectarian and religious groups - 
namely, Muslims (Shi’ite and Sunnis), Christians, Yazidis, Kurds. As the clear 
majority of the population is Muslim the Islamic perspective on justice can shed light 
on some of the motives and factors affecting the understanding of the concept. “All 
contemporary Muslim states have hybrid legal system, wherein Islamic law coexists 
in part with other aspects of law that derive from states whose origins are in the 
common Law or civil law.” (Bassiouni 2014, p. 104). Although, Iraq is divided in 
different sectarian and religious factions, the Islamic theories of justice - as a norm 
and tradition setting system - play a role in influencing the understanding and 
perception of justice.  
 
Studying the Islamic understanding of justice, the division between divine and human 
justice has formed the base for Islamic philosophers’ debates. Ibn Rushd (Averroes), a 
medieval Islamic philosopher, Ibn Sina, and al-Ghazzali are the three main Islamic 
philosophers who have explored the concept of justice from an Islamic perspective 
(Bassiouni 2014).  
Khuddari (1984) in his book argues that all three scholars have approached the 
concept as being divided in two categories - human justice and divine justice. The 
divine justice being the perfect form and the human one imperfect. However, divine 
justice can always be understood as, “...nothing but the manifestation of God’s Will - 
if an act is commanded by God, it must be just and if it is prohibited, it must be 
unjust, even if it appeared to man as unjust, …” (Ibid., p.94).  
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Moreover, Ibn Sina, further explains human justice through the state and political 
formations of societies. He argues that, justice can only be served, through 
negotiations of the society that has formed a political order. “A political order came 
into existence on the basis of an original contract, formally agreed upon between the 
Ruler and people.” (Khuddari 1984, p.89). However, it is important to keep in mind 
that these thoughts of justice still will be subject to the overruling divine justice. 
Therefore, justice is what the society agrees on, based on fair negotiations, however 
within the frame set by divine justice. (Khuddari 1984, Solomon and Murphy 1990).  
 
Subjective nature of judgments of justice 
Concluding on the discussions above, it can be argued that the understanding of 
justice to a high extent is influenced by our culture and history - and in some 
societies, such as Iraq, also to a high extent by religion. Although, there are debates 
amongst scholars whether justice is natural or socially constructed, there is little doubt 
that the understanding of justice is strongly influenced by social factors, i.e. culture, 
history, and religion. This, however, merely adds to the argument of “...the basically 
subjective nature of judgments of justice and injustice.” (Mikula 2001, p. 8063). So 
even though it may be possible to draw some general conclusions on what an Iraqi (or 
any other society or group for that matter) understanding of justice may look like, it is 
important to keep in mind the subjective nature of the perception of justice. This is 
due to the unique nature and context (personal history, culture and religion) of every 
individual, which does influence the perception of justice. 
  
However, what is of importance for this study is not how the Iraqis - or rather the 
different Iraqi ethno-religious groups - theoretically or abstractly understand the 
concept of justice. Furthermore, the theoretical and abstract understanding of justice is 
not really the core matter for this study. How - or whether - the Iraqi ethno-religious 
groups perceived the making of the 2005 constitution as just or unjust is ultimately 
not determined by their underlying (and abstract) understanding of justice, but rather 
by how certain current societal developments (economic, political and social) are 
experienced and interpreted.  
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Justice in the domains of social life 
In “...all three domains of social life in which justice is crucial…”, different aspects or 
ideas of justice can be regarded as most important (Montada 2001, p. 8037). The three 
domains of social life are according to Montada, the domain of: a) distribution, b) 
social exchange relationships, and c) retributive justice. With this Montada wants to 
show how the context - or rather domain of social life - is influencing what people 
consider as just or unjust. The perception of justice, is thus according to Montada 
(2001) influenced by the circumstances and thus, consequently, to a smaller extent 
influenced by the individually held theoretical or abstract understanding of justice. 
The subjective or societal considerations of what is just or unjust is thus framed by 
different aspects belonging to the different domains of social life. 
 
Considering issues of distribution - whether this may be distribution of rights, goods, 
power, opportunities, etc. - the main idea of justice is bound up to the concept of 
equality (Ibid.). Equality, despite different understandings of what equal distribution 
in practice is, can thus be perceived as an indicator of what is just or unjust. Equality, 
and what this entails, are thus of core importance in understanding what justice is 
when regarding issues of distribution. As a political philosopher Rawls argues that if 
the citizens have the equal rights to participate in economic activities and to welfare 
then justice is served. His theory of justice excuses the economic inequalities in the 
society, but argues that welfare should benefit the poorest citizens the most (1971). 
The distribution of resources should be in such a way that benefits and burdens are 
divided in society in such a manner that the ‘least-advantaged’ citizens are favoured 
(Quong 2007). Ultimately, what Rawls attempts is  “...to find a proper ordering 
between equality and liberty with particular concern for the needs of the “least 
advantaged” in society…” (Solomon & Murphy 1990 p.6). 
Equality and justice are debated by two main groups of scholars, the egalitarians and 
the anti-egalitarians also referred to as prioritarians. The egalitarians argue that justice 
and equality are similarly important and cannot be separated. This group of authors 
believe in distributive justice claiming that justice and equality have identical values. 
They claim that humans are equal and thus deserve equal social, economic and 
political rights. Egalitarians use equality in a normative sense, arguing that there is no 
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question about equality and justice, because equality is the ultimate goal of justice. 
Meaning, equally treating people according to their dues. 
However, the anti-egalitarians (prioritarians) argue that justice is valuable but equality 
is not. Equality is thus understood, not as the ultimate goal of justice, but simply a by-
product of it. Prioritarians question the core of what is fair or not and how the 
egalitarians define fair. If both the advantaged and the disadvantaged had the same 
opportunities then it is not fair, according to prioritarians, to cut down the resources of 
the most advantaged (Miller 1997, Segal 2012, and Meyer 2006).  
Focusing only on economic distribution, in an attempt to limit inequalities in a 
society, overlooks the processes and developments that have created such inequalities. 
Redistributionists and extreme egalitarians take the social processes that created 
inequalities for granted and only focus on economic aspects of it (Lister 2013). 
Perfect redistribution of resources can thus also be argued to be unjust. In that case to 
those who have earned the resources, but also at times disrespectful for those who 
need to reveal their inabilities and weaknesses in order to receive benefits (Wolff 
1998). On the other hand, awarding those for their participation in society will also 
limit those disabled and how they can be treated. Moreover, it is not just reciprocity 
itself, but the structure and the way it is conducted as well, that has consequences for 
social relations. The reciprocity structure can build trust and solidarity, because 
believing to be treated fair creates a sound relation between members of the society 
(Molm 2010). 
For Montada’s domain of social exchange relationships “...the equality criterion is 
found in the principles of reciprocity and equity as well as in the concept of fair 
contract.” (Ibid., p. 8038 [emphasis in original]). “…[P]eople do not stand in a 
relation of equality if it is not common knowledge that they regard one another as 
equals, and if they do not treat one another as equals in daily life” (Lister 2013 p.73). 
Therefore, equality, equity and fairness can only be achieved if the society in general 
and as a common knowledge recognises each other as equals. As Montada argues, 
“[j]ustice is threatened if relevant information is withheld, if pressure is exerted, or if 
one party is not free to refuse to enter into the contract on account of a certain 
predicament” (Montada 2001 p.8028). This could be seen as a way to marginalise 
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one party and thus limit the chances of equal social relations, which has negative 
consequences on the perception of justice. 
In the last of Montada’s social domains - namely, retributive justice, impartiality and 
proportionality are of core importance in regarding what is just and unjust (Ibid.). 
Still, the basic idea of justice is closely related to equality and equity. Depending on 
the context - or social domain - different indicators or ideas are thus of importance to 
understand what justice is.   
 
A further aspect is that elements of society, such as for instance the constitution, laws 
and institutions, deal with the three domains of social life described above. Therefore, 
these too become subject to subjective judgements of justice by citizens. Individuals 
or social groups may perceive official elements of society as being either just or 
unjust based on the impact the laws or institutions bring to their situation and 
circumstances (Montada 2001).  
 
2.3 Reconciliation 
In this part we will explore reconciliation seen as a goal of post-conflict parties. The 
concept of reconciliation has a long history. Reconciliation is about identifying an 
injustice in a relationship and then repair the harm done in order for the relationship to 
continue (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014). Here it is important to note that repairing the 
harm(s) done “...is not to right wrongs, but to restore a stable social and political 
order.” (Amstutz 2005). Or as Skaar, Gloppen and Suhrke argues “[r]econciliation 
refers to the processes of different kinds and at various levels. It is about individuals 
forgiving each other; about societies torn apart by conflict mending their social fabric 
and reconstituting the desire to live together, and about peaceful coexistence and 
social stability.” (2005, p.20). 
 
In this section we will look at reconciliation as a process rather than a goal. As stated 
by Skaar, Gloppen and Suhrke (2005) reconciliation is a process that can be used on 
different levels. From the interpersonal level to political level, to the international 
level. Furthermore, these levels can be subdivided into different forms of 
reconciliation such as social reconciliation and political reconciliation (Amstutz 
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2005). The following section will give a brief explanation of a few of the overall 
levels. 
 
On the interpersonal level, reconciliation is understood as a therapeutic goal, and has 
been seen as related to the theological ideas of confession, forgiveness, and mercy. 
This means that at the interpersonal level, reconciling is about restoring the moral 
inequality which has been caused by a perpetrator to a victim. As stated this is a 
therapeutic goal and uses therapeutic methods, rather than punishment that a 
retributive justice conception would offer. 
At a collective level, which can be understood as both between communities and 
groups on a regional or national level, reconciliation is seen as “how a society torn 
apart by internal conflict can mend its social fabric” (Skaar, Gloppen and Suhrke 
2005, p. 20). National reconciliation has in literature been divided into “thicker” and 
“thinner” notions of reconciliation. Where in the “thicker” notion the goal is “a shared 
comprehensive vision of a common future” (Ibid. 2005, p.20) whereas in the 
“thinner” the minimum definition is nonviolent coexisting. 
When working at the collective level rather than the interpersonal level, the process of 
reconciliation becomes more complex. This is due to the fact that more factors come 
into play as the amount of people involved increases with the addition that the 
potential of the violation becomes bigger as well. The goal of reconciliation at the 
collective level is also contested. The “thicker”, or most optimal outcome is to unite a 
splitted region or nation into one people who share the same goals for a shared future, 
whereas the “thinner”, or minimum (successful) outcome would be seen as a stop of 
violence and and a people who accept all as equals, yet not as one united people. 
Reconciliation can also be applied on an international level. The overall goal of 
international reconciliation is the same as with the collective level. One of the most 
prominent examples of this is Germany and France (and the rest of europe) after the 
first and especially the second World War (Amstutz 2005 p. 65). 
 
There are multiple ways of attempting reconciling broken relationships regardless of 
which level we are operating. These different ways or strategies, have been divided 
into different categories by different scholars in the field. Skaar, Gloppen and Suhrke 
(2005), for instance, argue that reconciliation strategies can be divided into five 
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categories. However, these categories are to be understood mainly as analytical tools 
as policies for reconciliation most often contain more than one, if not close to all, 
categories. Skaar, Gloppen and Suhrke (2005) outline the five categories for the 
reconciliation process as: a) (Retributive) Justice: The thought that lasting 
reconciliation can be achieved if perpetrators and collaborators are trialed in a legal 
system and punished according to their crime. b) Truth: The assumption that through 
knowledge about the past (what happened and about who did what) reconciliation can 
be achieved. c) Restitution: This category focuses on the victims of the conflict and 
that through restitution and rehabilitation of the victims, and not the perpetrators, 
reconciliation can be achieved. d) Reform: The idea that is it the future that is 
important when trying to reconcile and not the past. This category focuses on creating 
institutions that can prevent violation, for instance of human rights, from happening 
again. And the last one, e) Oblivion: Which basically is doing nothing. Trying to 
move on, through public amnesia or amnesty legislation. 
 
No matter how the process of reconciliation is perceived, it is evident that the concept 
is closely interlinked with the concept of justice. In their book Restorative Justice, 
Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding, Llewellyn and Philpott (2014), however, argue 
that reconciliation presupposes a certain perception of justice, namely a relational 
conception of justice. This we will turn to now. 
 
2.4 Reconciliation, justice, and peacebuilding 
When looking at the different levels of reconciliation it appears what they have in 
common is restoring the relationship between two or more parties through justice. 
This is the argument presented by Llewellyn and Philpott in their book Restorative 
Justice, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding (2014), in which they present a holistic 
framework to understand the three concepts. 
As previously stated, at the very core of reconciliation lies justice. However, justice is 
not just justice and there are many different theories of justice.  Each understanding or 
interpretation of these will depend on the subjective historical and cultural 
background, yet reconciliation, according to Llewellyn and Philpott (2014), 
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presupposes just one understanding of justice. A holistic and relational understanding 
of justice. 
This holistic understanding that Llewellyn and Philpott suggest, is a relational 
approach to justice that is “not simply concerned with responding to wrongs but rather 
with the harm and effects of wrongs on relationships at all levels: individual, group, 
community, national, and international.” (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014 p.16). This 
stands in contrast to the retributive justice paradigm, which will be elaborated upon 
further below. 
This means that justice is no longer concerned with either past or the future, but rather 
about restoring the relationship between the perpetrator and victim, and by doing so, 
ensuring that the conditions for the wrongdoing are vanquished.  According to 
Llewellyn and Philpott (2014), the orthodox understanding of justice has up till now 
been a reflection of Western liberal individualism. They argue that a “...stress on the 
individual and his autonomy, understood as freedom from the interference of others, 
rests at the core of these conceptions. Such an individualist orientation has profoundly 
shaped ideas of justice and peace and the processes and institutions through which 
they are pursued…” (Ibid., p.16). 
Furthermore, Llewellyn and Philpott (2014) argue that in order to achieve and 
maintain peace, additional tools need to be added to the peacebuilding ‘toolbox’. In 
the process of reconciliation, they argue that, we are not independent of each other but 
rather interdependent, and that our autonomy and freedom are not found in separation 
but in mutual construction and the support of others. Therefore, within this 
framework, reconciliation aims at achieving healthy or peaceful relationships. When a 
wrong is committed to an individual or community, the response should be to get the 
relationship between the victim(s) and perpetrator(s) to a point where all parties 
involved share an equality in the basic needs of a relationship. Equality of respect, 
dignity, and mutual concern for one another (Ibid., p.19). All this is not just important 
during the period of transition between conflict and stability, but also when stability is 
achieved, as it is a vital part of keeping the society stable. 
In this framework, retributive justice is not perceived as a method of achieving stable 
peace, or a reconciled nation. This is due to the fact that, retributive justice focuses on 
the wrongdoings of the past. As the name suggests, within the retributive paradigm, 
justice is achieved through the process of legal retribution. “According to 
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retributive justice theory, when perpetrators commit an offense against other persons, 
they destroy the fundamental moral and legal equality among human beings.” 
(Amstutz 2005). Hereby not said that, retributive justice has no place within this 
framework. However, it cannot be used as a sole and standalone tool.  
 
2.5 Sub-conclusion 
Recapitulating on the above, it has been argued that for reconciliation to emerge in a 
broken and divided society, both material as well as relational restoration must occur. 
As shown, many factors influence this restoration. What has been in focus here is the 
close relation between justice and reconciliation. The perception of what is just or 
unjust, it has been argued, is flavoured by several factors, here in particular culture 
and religion have been underlined, but also perception of for instance social, political 
and economical distribution in society. Justice and reconciliation are thus closely 
related and dependent. Justice is an important part of reconciliation and similarly, 
equality is a fundamental part of justice. Therefore, different parts of the theory are 
interlinked in some manner. Meaning, each section provides an explanation to the 
other and they build up on each other. For instance, the causes and effects of different 
themes, such as distribution, marginalisation, and representation within equality shed 
light on perception of justice. This perception can determine if and how relations have 
been restored to achieve reconciliation in order to achieve peace.   
 
Chapter 3: The Iraqi Context 
3.1 Introduction 
“Understanding the history of Iraq is crucial when trying to answer pertinent 
questions in the search for a peaceful solution.” (Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009, p. 
1035). With this in mind, this chapter thus provides a basic foundation to understand 
the context and history of Iraq relevant for this study. It will not be a chronological 
outline of main events in Iraqi history, but rather an introduction to and reflection 
over main components and developments important for this study. 
Of key importance here is what this study refers to as the Iraqi ethno-religious groups 
and the interrelational developments concerning these. Broadly speaking, the ethno-
23	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
religious groups consist of three main actors, namely Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and 
the Kurds. When providing this context introduction and reflection, matters will to 
some extent be simplified and generalised. As the methodological discussion about 
group further above also highlights it is contestable to argue that a certain group holds 
a certain opinion or perceives things in a specific way. However, such a simplification 
is inevitable in order to summarise and account for the context relevant here (Chaplin 
2006). Consequently, this context setting chapter will present the different groups 
more homogeneous and united than what actually correlates with reality. 
Concretely, this chapter will first look into the religious divide in the Muslim majority 
population between Shia Islam and Sunni Islam. Second, the ethnic divide between 
Arab and non-Arab (i.e. the Kurds) will be explored, before looking briefly into the 
effects the international community - the US in particular - have had on the 
developments in Iraq. 
 
3.2 Sunni-Shia divide 
The schism in Islam that ultimately formed the two different sub-groups, Sunni- and 
Shia-Islam, was the outcome of disputes dating back to the very beginning of Islam’s 
history. Today approximately 10% (120 million people) of the world's 1.3 billion 
Muslims are Shi’ites - the remaining 90% Sunni Muslims (Nasr 2010).   
Karmon has argued that since the beginning “...the Shia have been the underdogs – 
oppressed and marginalized by Sunni ruling regimes and majority communities.” 
(2007, p. 275). However, other scholars, such as for instance Haddad (2013) and 
Sarkin and Sensibaugh (2009), argue that the rivalry between the two different 
religious communities should not be overemphasised. In many Muslim populations 
throughout the world, Sunni and Shia Muslims coexists despite the theological and 
ritual disputes. Sectarianism, Haddad argues, “...must not be viewed as a static 
constant; rather it is always evolving to accommodate the sociopolitical and economic 
conditions of the day.” (2013, p. 117). This is important in understanding the Sunni-
Shia divide - also in the case of Iraq. Religious differences are not necessarily (if 
ever) the main factors dividing a society into opposing sects or groups. Sarkin and 
Sensibaugh argue, that “[t]he violence between the [Sunni and Shia] groups has a 
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history: a history not based on religion but on access to resources, power, and the 
social contract.” (Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009, p. 1036). 
 
This quote above is relevant for Iraq, as well as many other communities with a 
mixed Sunni and Shia population. Currently in Iraq the relationship between the Shia 
majority (65%) and the Sunni minority (35%) is very hostile, however, this is not 
necessarily due to the religious division. Sarkin and Sensibaugh argue that ”...the real 
hatred between Sunni and Shi'ites in Iraq: ‘is the product of centuries of social, 
political, and economic inequality imposed by repression and prejudice and frequently 
reinforced by bloodshed. The hatred is not principally about religion ...’” (2009, 
p.1038). This, however, makes matters rather complex. The groups are identified by 
religious belonging - Sunni or Shia - but the un-static relationship between the groups, 
which at the moment is very hostile, is influenced and shaped by social, political, and 
economic matters. “When sectarian identity becomes politically relevant, or when 
sectarian tensions rise for whatever reason, fears of the other and negative stereotypes 
that had long been dormant come to the fore; hence the repetition, over centuries, of 
the same accusations and the same polemics between Shias and Sunnis.” (Haddad 
2013, p. 120). Politics, social developments and economic matters are thus crucial for 
the relationship between the two Iraqi groups.   
 
The history - and especially the modern history - of Iraq is of importance in 
understanding the politicisation of the Sunni-Shia divide. Sarkin and Sensibaugh 
argue, that the real motives or goals of the fighting is “... the secular prize of political 
supremacy.” (2009, p. 1038). 
An important factor in shaping the current hostility in the relationship between Sunnis 
and Shia Muslims is the 35 years of Iraqi history, where the nation has been ruled by 
the authoritarian Ba’ath regime, personified by Saddam Hussein. The Ba’ath party 
took power from the Iraqi monarchy in 1963 in a bloody coup d’ état and in 1979 
Saddam Hussein assumed the leadership of the party and thus became the ruler of Iraq 
(Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009). This marked a new era of Iraq, an era where ethnicity 
and religious affiliation became of core importance. Saddam Hussein, himself a Sunni 
Muslim, favored Sunnis over Shia Muslims and the Kurdish minority (despite that 
also being Sunni Muslim). Being a Sunni Arab became of core importance, and 
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Saddam Hussein and his regime carried out a policy that repressed everyone that was 
not either Sunni or Arab (Ibid.). How this affected the Kurds is elaborated further 
below, here the main focus is the effect on the religious divisions. 
 
Under the Saddam Hussein regime (1979-2003) the Shia majority was discriminated 
by the Ba’ath regime. Scholars argue that for Shia Muslims, living under the Ba’ath 
regime was like living under apartheid, however, not everywhere - nor at all times - 
the repression was equally strong (Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009, p. 1041). The scope 
of the repression ranged from abolishing Shi’ite ceremonies and gatherings to 
systematic executions and killings. Sarkin and Sensibaugh conclude by stating 
“[u]nder Saddam Hussein's regime, Shi'ites were indiscriminately slaughtered merely 
for being Shi'ite. The legacy of these events remains a constant cloud over Iraq.” 
(2009, p.1042). 
The repression of the Shia majority has thus played a great part in shaping the mainly 
negative developments after the downfall of the Ba’ath regime following the US 
invasion in 2003. Chaplin writes in 2006, commenting on the three years after the 
regime change: “Extreme mistrust between the parties…This has produced a mindset 
which insists, not so much on revenge (although that instinct has also been marked), 
as on an absolute determination to secure once and for all those rights denied so 
long…” (2006, p.273 [emphasis in original]). The regime of Saddam Hussein thus 
resulted to further reinforce the divides between the two Muslim groups. Religious 
identity therefore increasingly became a more and more important factor of social 
identity. The Shia Muslims developed a growing mistrust towards the Sunni during 
the Ba’ath regime, despite the fact, it was the Ba’ath regime - and not the Sunni 
minority as a religious social group - that carried out the repression and 
discrimination. However, the attacks on the Shia communities, on the background of 
their religious identity, caused a stronger and more politicised Shia identity. When the 
repressing grip of the Ba’ath regime was removed in 2003 the sectarian tensions that 
had been growing during the many years of repression slowly were released (Haddad 
2013). However, the escalation of these sectarian tensions to the violent level it 
reached in 2006 and 2007 were, according to Haddad “...unlike anything experienced 
in living Iraqi memory.” (2013, p. 116). He continues, “sectarian identity, in and of 
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itself, rather than, for example, affiliation to a political grouping associated with a 
particular sect, became the cause and target of unbridled violence.” (Ibid.). 
According to Haddad (2013) the extreme escalation of the sectarian tensions, turning 
into violence, in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq were not the inevitable result or 
conclusion of the sectarian divide Iraq have experienced since its very foundations 
were lain. Nor was it representative of the relationship between the groups, because 
for more than 1000 years, the “...Sunnis and Shias have, by and large, coexisted 
peacefully but without breaking down sectarian boundaries.” (Haddad 2013, p. 118). 
Rather, the sectarian tensions that in 2006-7 culminated in violence, that by many 
observers have been described as a civil war, were the outcome of sociopolitical 
developments and sectarian identities that increasingly were expressed and 
understood in opposition to the ‘other’ (Ibid.). 
 
After the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Shia majority was freed from the 
repression of the Ba’ath regime and within a relatively short timeframe Iraq was led 
by a Shi’ite dominated government. However, there was extreme mistrust between the 
different sectarian groups (Chaplin 2006). And when “...members of a community 
feel their identity is threatened, they will increasingly act in accordance with that 
identity’s points of reference rather than their own individualistic ones or wider forms 
of identification, such as national identity.” (Haddad 2013, p. 134). This further adds 
to the escalation of sectarian tension and the Iraqis increasingly understand their 
identity in relation to the opposing religious groups narratives and symbols. Thus, 
when for example the extremist Sunni terror-group al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM) 
after 2005 increasingly started to attack Shi’ites and their holy shrines, due to the 
mere fact of them being shi’ite, this further reinforced the distrust and opposition 
between the groups. AQM’s strategy of attacking the Shia population and their 
religious symbols - thus attacking their identity - served as an attempt to stir up the 
sectarian tensions and ultimately remove the Shi’ite government from power (al-
Sheikh and Sky 2011). The leader of AQM, al-Zarqawi’s intention “...was to bring 
about sectarian conflict that would cause the collapse of the state, which he intended 
to replace with an Islamic caliphate.” (Ibid., p. 123). 
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The Sunni-Shia divide in Iraq is complex and contested. The dichotomy between the 
Sunni and Shia identity is part of the issues that needs consideration for the process of 
national reconciliation to succeed. However, the Sunni-Shia dichotomy, in itself as a 
religious divide, is not an obstacle for national reconciliation. Rather, as argued by 
Haddad (2013), it is an integrated and natural component of the history and identity of 
Iraq. 
 
3.3 Ethnic divide - the Kurds 
Along side the Sunni-Shia religious divide in Iraq, exists an ethnic differentiation 
between Arabs and non-Arabs, which mainly refers to the Kurds that constitute 
approximately 15% of the Iraqi population. The ethnic group of the Kurds is not 
merely present in Iraq, but neighbouring countries like Syria, Iran and Turkey also 
have Kurdish minorities (Rogg and Rimscha 2007). In Iraq the Kurdish minority, 
despite the shared ethnic roots, is a community “...religiously and linguistically 
diverse and the Kurdish identity has existed alongside, overlapped with or even 
contradicted other identities.” (Rogg and Rimscha 2007, p. 825). As it is problematic 
and simplifying matters substantially to refer to a single Sunni or single Shia identity, 
likewise defining a single, unified Kurdish identity is contested and problematic. The 
tribes and parties comprising the Kurdish people of Iraq are recognised by diverging 
attitudes towards politics, religion, and other peoples groups (whether Kurdish or not) 
(Ibid., p. 825). However, some generalisation and simplification of matters are 
inevitable here in order to set up an understanding of the ethnic issues and tensions of 
Iraq of importance for this study. 
Since the emergence of the Iraqi nation from the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds have 
been a part of Iraq. However, one objective has always been of crucial importance to 
the Kurds - namely, autonomy from Iraq and the creation of an independent Kurdish 
nation state. Against this backdrop, Kurdish-Iraqi relations have always been framed 
by and shadowed by the Kurdish longing for independence and secession (Rogg and 
Rimscha 2007).         
Here, different historical developments of the Kurdish-Iraqi relationship will be 
explored. These will serve to set the stage for understanding the role of the Kurds in 
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the context of contemporary Iraq and the processes of reconciliation of importance 
here. 
 
The first historical development important for the Kurdish-Iraqi relationship evolved 
in the period from the emergence of the Iraqi state after the First World War until the 
US invasion of 2003. From the early emergence of the Iraqi nation state, tension and 
rebellions of various extent have shaped the relationships between the Kurds and the 
Iraqi government (Rogg and Rimscha 2007). Despite these recurring tensions in this 
first epoch of modern Iraqi history the relationship never turned completely bad. 
However, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 dramatically changed this. During this war 
the Iraqi Kurds formed an alliance with the Shia regime of Iran and fought against the 
Iraqi Ba’ath government. This resulted in the Iraqis cracking down hard on the Kurds 
(Ibid., p. 827). In the period up until the 1991 Gulf War the Iraqi Ba’ath regime 
treated the Kurds harsh and systematic violence and oppression were carried out 
against the Kurds. However, much of the harsh systematic violations and murders of 
the Kurdish people remained unnoticed by the international community, except for a 
brutal attack with chemical weapons in 1988 (Ibid. p. 828). As a consequence, severe 
hostility and mistrust shaped the Kurdish attitude towards the Iraqi state and the strive 
and longing for independence and autonomy grew even stronger. 
A breakthrough in this regard followed the 1991 Gulf War. As a result of this and the 
US-led attacks, a de facto Kurdish state arose in northern Iraq (Gunter 2004, p. 108). 
This de facto Kurdish state, protected by the US, was not a nation state, but rather an 
Iraqi region with a strong sense of independence and de facto self-rule (Rogg and 
Rimscha 2007, p. 829). The new Kurdish self-rule, KRG (Kurdistan Regional 
Government), was challenged by political inexperience and the task of managing the 
humanitarian issues of the previously repressed Kurds, and by 1994 tensions between 
the two Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK, had developed into an inter-Kurdish civil 
war. These fightings were not settled until 1998 (Ibid.). The relationship between the 
two different groups, however, remained hostile until early 2000s, but generally the 
groups ceased from fighting (Ibid.). 
 
Despite the inter-Kurdish tensions, the developments in this first period created an 
ever increasing wish for independence and autonomy from Iraq. However, as the 
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period between 2003 and 2010 shows, a new interpretation of these main objectives 
emerged, now seeing the advantages of federalism in the new Iraq as the way forward 
(Rogg and Rimscha 2007). One lesson learned for the Kurds - or a memory burnt into 
their core of their identity - is the systematic repression and persecution carried out by 
the centralised Ba’ath regime. This lesson was kept inherent in their shared memory, 
which has invoked a strong resistance against a centralised Iraq (Ibid.) 
 
The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and the creation of the ‘new Iraq’ proved a window 
of opportunity for the Kurds of Iraq in influencing the new Iraq in the direction of 
federalism and thus greater autonomy within the nation of Iraq (Rogg and Rimscha 
2007). Their resistance of a centralised rule and their strive for greater autonomy 
became a driving force for the Kurds. As the Sunnis in the early stages resisted 
cooperating with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a Shi’ite political coalition, in 
rebuilding a new political and constitutional Iraq, the Kurds became a very important 
player. 
Barkey and Laipson sum up the impact and role of the Kurds in the early stages of 
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq as follows: 
“The Kurds have contributed, for better or worse, intentionally or not, to 
today’s dynamics. Their early and energetic advocacy for federalism 
compounded the Sunnis’ problem and made Sunni alienation from the 
political process more acute. Kurds cannot be singled out as bad actors, but 
their demands have complicated the quest for a unified, stable and peaceful 
Iraq.” (2005, p.74). 
 
The last argument by Barkey and Laipson is of interest for our study of the 
reconciliation processes. They claim the Kurds’ demands for federalism and greater 
autonomy have complicated the ‘quest for a unified, stable and peaceful Iraq’. The 
Kurds - and this must be understood in the light of their past experiences with the 
centralised Iraqi regime - have no interest in moving towards a centralised and unified 
Iraq - therefore, the quest for a federal Iraq. After the downfall of the Saddam regime 
they wanted a new Iraq, however, they were - on the background of their past 
experiences - worried about the Arab quest for a unified Iraq (Rogg and Rimscha 
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2007, p. 830). They thus saw a federal Iraq, where the different federal states had 
greater autonomy and somewhat self-rule, as the solution to their dilemma. 
 
After the 2010 Iraqi national election and the withdrawal of US forces in 2011, the 
Kurds’ pursuit of keeping the autonomy the early negotiations in post-Saddam 
Hussein Iraq had secured them, was challenged. The Shi’ite Prime Minister al-Maliki 
increasingly sought to centralise his power, a development extremely uncomfortable 
to the Kurds (Özpek 2012, p. 128). As Özpek argues, “Maliki’s strategy reminds 
Kurds of their historical fears inherited from the Ba’athist Iraq, which was a perfect 
model of a strong and central state.” (2012, p. 137). 
 
The history and experiences of systematic repression and the persistent quest for 
autonomy and independence of the Kurds are challenges to reconciliation processes in 
Iraq. The Kurds have build up an inherent mistrust to the central government in 
Baghdad, what ever shape or size that might take. Taking the history and experiences 
into consideration this is not surprising. However, as long as the Kurdish past remains 
unconfronted and unsettled by the ethnic Arab population, and here the Arab Sunnis 
in particular, challenging obstacles for unity and reconciliation remain inherent in the 
multi-ethnic society of Iraq. 
 
3.4 Impact of the International Community 
The international community, with the US as the main actor, have interfered and 
impacted Iraq at numerous occasions throughout the modern history of Iraq. At times 
the interference in Iraqi matters have merely taken the form of advises (more or less 
compulsory, though), other times economic sanctions and sharp demands have been 
the strategy applied. Further, at a few occasions, military intervention and occupation 
have been the approach taken by the international community. Issues of  human rights 
violations, fear of chemical weapons, terror and supply of oil have been important 
arguments for US and international interference in Iraqi national matters (Kaae and 
Nissen 2008). Here, however, only a few examples of international interference will 
be given to exemplify how these in many cases have served to reinforce the sectarian 
tensions and frontiers even stronger. 
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In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War after the US had defeated the Iraqi and freed 
the Kuwaiti people from the occupation of the Saddam Hussein regime, the Shi’ite 
population in Iraq revolted against the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. Saddam’s defeat 
in Kuwait was interpreted as a window of opportunity for gaining the freedom they 
lacked under the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein (Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009). 
However, “...without help from allied forces led by the United States, Saddam 
Hussein was able to  smash the revolt.” (Ibid. p.1042). This had enormous negative 
consequences for the Shia population. The regime of Saddam cracked down hard on 
the Shia revolt, and more than 300.000 Shi'ites were killed (Ibid.). The passivity and 
lacking actions of the US in supporting the revolting Shia population, thus indirectly 
impacted the interrelational development and sectarian tensions in Iraq. As argued by 
Haddad (2013) above, when members of a community, such as the Shia here, feel that 
their identity is threatened - which Saddam’s crackdown on the Shia population after 
the revolt really was - that community will increasingly act and understand itself in 
accordance to the community identity. The community profile or -identify will thus 
become stronger, and the community will further understand itself in opposition to the 
opposing community or group.  Whether the US acted right or wrong in regards to not 
supporting the Shia revolt is outside the scope of this study, what is of importance 
here is rather the implications third party interference ultimately have on Iraq national 
matters and interrelational developments. This serves as an example of how 
developments in Iraq also have been framed and influenced by the international 
community. 
 
Another example of international interference in Iraq is the heavy international 
economic sanctions the country was exposed to up until the US led invasion in 2003. 
These sanctions had a devastating and destroying effect on the Iraqi institutions, and 
thus ultimately on the Iraqi people (Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009). This marginalised 
groups further and put them under even more stress, and developed a strong hatred 
against the US and international community. Traces of this hatred can be seen post-
2003 as different militant Sunni groups increasingly joint forces in fighting US forces, 
despite the groups had very diverging goal and objectives. The mere common 
objective, was the short term goal of expelling the US troops from Iraq (al-Sheikh 
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and Sky 2011). These militant Sunni groups, with AQM as a main actor, played a 
major role in the escalation of sectarian violence, that in 2006-7 turned into a state of 
civil war between the different ethno-religious groups of Iraq (Haddad 2013). 
 
The most extensive interference in Iraqi national matters carried out by the 
international community was the 2003 invasion, where the US-led coalition removed 
Saddam Hussein and his authoritarian Ba’ath regime from power. This invasion and 
the following statebuilding process  initiated by the US and international community 
influenced Iraq and the interrelational developments extensively. Paradoxical to the 
extensive impact on Iraqi society, Sarkin and Sensibaugh direct severe critique of the 
US planning - or rather the lack of planning - of both military actions, state building 
processes, reconciliation processes, and future plans and developments (2009, p.1058-
1062). These areas have influenced the state of Iraq extensively. Some of these issues 
will be analysed further in the following chapter, here however it is sufficient to make 
clear that the rebuilding of post-Iraq was heavily influenced by American values and 
ideas (Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009). 
 
3.5 Sub-conclusion 
This chapter provides relevant but not chronological historical and ethno-religious 
accounts of Iraq. It can be summarised that certain divides exist amongst the three 
ethno-religious groups, but the divisions are of complicated nature, as there are 
divisions of different nature not only amongst the three groups, but also within each. 
On the other hand, the division of a population according to ethno-religious groups is 
very challenging, as detecting a certain groups’ opinion and then affiliating that to a 
certain group is very contestable. However, for the sake of providing a context in the 
project some simplifications have occurred.  Moreover, historical accounts of US and 
international intervention in Iraq are also illustrated and it can be finalised that the 
invasions and sanctions have played an important role in Iraq. 
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Chapter 4 - analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter at hand will be analytical in nature and provides answers to whether the 
different ethno-religious groups in Iraq have perceived the making of the 2005 
constitution as just or unjust. Furthermore, implications of the extent this has affected 
the national reconciliation processes will be explored. In concrete terms, this will be 
undertaken in three sections, each section analysing one of the three ethno-religious 
groups. In the first section, the case of the Arab Sunni Muslims will be explored, 
thereafter the Arab Shia Muslims, and lastly the Kurds. The analysis in each main 
section is subsequently divided into different themes derived from the theoretical 
framework explained further above. First theme of the analysis, is thus an analysis of 
how history has influenced the different groups’ perception of justice. Second theme 
is how issues of equality - or the lack of - has further influenced the three ethno-
religious groups’ perception of justice. Equality is, as previously elaborated, a 
complex term, and the analytical theme has thus been expanded into three sub-
themes, representing different aspects related to equality. These sub-themes are 
distribution (mainly material distribution, economic distribution and distribution of 
resources), representation, and marginalisation. The three sections are structured 
around the two analytical themes, which thereby provides the main structure of the 
chapter. 
 
4.2 Arab Sunni Muslims 
History 
The legacy of past events and the emotional debates that were part of the 
constitutional negotiations can be detected in these following quotes. “Iraqi 
negotiators are not tinkering with an existing text in need of reform. They are 
deliberately attempting a radical break with the past.”, “For all the parties, criteria for 
Iraqi nationality has been an emotional point, since a favourite punishment in 
Ba’athist times was to deprive citizens of their nationality” (Chaplin 2006 p. 273, 
278). It can be derived that the Iraqis are influenced by their past and history. This 
history has affected them negatively, due to the oppression of the Ba’ath regime. 
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Chaplin further argues that, “[t]his has produced a mindset which insists, not so much 
on revenge (although that instinct has also been marked), as on an absolute 
determination to secure once and for all those rights denied so long…” (2006, p.273). 
This mindset has led to a determination amongst Shi’ites and Kurds to do whatever 
possible to secure and reclaim previously lost rights in order to avoid what happened 
to them in the past (Ibid.). However, for the Sunnis Arabs, it is rather a matter of 
defending themselves and their identity. 
 
The Sunnis, after the 2003 invasion, have been subject to an extreme de-
Ba’athification programme aimed at the Ba’athists in the old regime. As argued by 
Cetinsaya, the de-Ba’athification programme was aimed at a limited elite within the 
Ba’ath Party, however “...almost 750 thousand civil servants including teachers and 
doctors lost their jobs.” (2007, p. 47). In such an environment as illustrated by the 
empirical data, it can be argued that the Iraqi constitutional negotiations were taking 
place in a sensitive period, where all sides were subject to emotional behaviours as a 
result of a series of incidents from the past. The de-Baathification programme hurt the 
Sunnis taking part in the constitutional negotiations. The empirical text also states that 
Sunnis mistrusted the Shi’ites and Kurds as a consequence of the de-Ba’athification 
programme (Chaplin 2006). This environment, as mentioned in the empirical 
literature applied here, has been created because of the history that these ethno-
religious groups have been exposed to. Hence it can be argued that the environment of 
mistrust at the time of the constitutional negotiations have negatively influenced the 
Sunnis’ perception of whether the negotiations were just. 
 
Furthermore, the influence of Islamic theology on Sunni Iraqis during the 
constitutional making processes has implications. “Western observers tend to 
overlook the extent to which the identity of Iraq in the Arab and Islamic worlds has 
been another bone of contention in the constitutional negotiations.”(Chaplin 2006 
p.278). “In the negotiations, Sunni Arabs have been vociferous in insisting on the 
Arab heritage and orientation of Iraq.” (Ibid.).  This is a clear indication that religion 
has played an important role in the making of the constitution. Islam interpreted as the 
Arab heritage is an important issue for Sunni Arabs. Both al-Marashi (2005) and 
Chaplin (2006) highlight Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution. Article 2 of the Iraqi 
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constitution states that no law is allowed to be against Islam and democracy. The 
empirical data states that this article has been the point of heated debate, especially 
with the contradictions that Islam and certain human rights may have, such as the 
freedom and position of women (Mayer 2007). Chaplin (2006) further argues that 
some of the democratic values also can be seen incompatible with Sunni Arab 
religious beliefs, which has had implications in the way they understood Iraqi 
constitution in general.  
 
Equality 
a. Distribution 
Although Sunnis were allowed some compromises in the constitution with the help of 
UN and US, they still perceived the constitution as a mean to punish them for the 
crimes of the old Ba’athist regime. “Kanan Makiya has described the Constitution as 
a “punitive” document that penalizes Sunnis “for living in regions without oil” 
(McGarry & O’Leary 2007 p.681). This was because Sunnis are mainly dominated in 
areas with no oil. “Article 109 [now Article 112] requires the central government to 
distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and 
gives regions a role in allocating revenues from new energy discoveries” (Katzman 
2008). With the existing mistrust between the ethno-religious groups and heated 
constitutional negotiations where Sunnis felt misrepresented, the Sunnis perceived 
this as a future sign of dependency to oil rich areas. As mentioned in the theory 
“…[p]eople do not stand in a relation of equality if it is not common knowledge that 
they regard one another as equals, and if they do not treat one another as equals in 
daily life” (Lister 2013, p.73). The way the different ethno-religious groups have 
negotiated and later perceived Article 112 of the constitution based on Katzman’s 
(2008) analysis, indicates that a common knowledge to regard one another as equals 
is lacking in the Iraqi society. Consequently, the Sunnis see themselves being 
marginalised from distribution of resources and political opportunities. 
 
b. Representation 
The National Assembly of Iraq appointed a Constitutional Commission, which was in 
charge of drafting the constitution. The Constitutional Commission was formed 
proportionate to the number of seats that different ethno-religious groups had in the 
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National Assembly (Katzman 2008). Therefore, it is important to see the number of 
seats each ethno-religious group received in the January elections of 2005. The UIA 
received 140 of 275 seats, The Kurdistan Coalition List (KCL), who are all Kurds, 
received 75 seats. The mainly Sunni, Iraqis Party, that were in exile during Saddam’s 
regime and motivated by religious identity - not Arab ethnicity - received 14 seats, 
while the majority of Sunni Arabs boycotted the elections in the January 30, 2005. 
The National Assembly appointed a committee consisting of 55 members to draft the 
constitution. It consisted of 28 UIA-members, 15 KCL-members, and 12 independent 
members, however only two of these members were Sunnis. Therefore, the Sunnis felt 
“...the politicians were ...unrepresentative of the Sunni population as a whole…” (al-
Marashi 2005 p.5).  
Furthermore, in the Islamic understanding of justice, fair negotiations are of 
significant importance (Khuddari 1984). Justice is thus what the society agrees on, 
based on fair negotiations (Khuddari 1984, Solomon and Murphy 1990). This 
indicates that religiously the Sunnis could not have considered the negotiation process 
as just, since they lacked representation and fair grounds for negotiations, as the 
Shi’ites and Kurds dominated the drafting commission. As stated in Chaplin, 
“[n]evertheless, Sunni representatives remain deeply unhappy with the terms of the 
draft approved by the National Assembly - as reflected in the high number of ‘no’ 
votes in the October 2005 referendum.” (2006, p.276). 
 
c. Marginalisation 
“[T]he constitutional negotiations, … produced a feeling among many Sunnis, even 
among those who had no connection with the regime (and who may also have 
suffered from it), that they have become the new oppressed minority, permanently 
denied any meaningful share of political or economic power” (Chaplin 2006, p. 273). 
The Sunnis were marginalised from constitutional negotiations because of an extreme 
de-Ba’thification programme that many Sunnis believed to be more of a de-
Sunnification than the expulsion of Ba’athist members of the previous regime (al-
Sheikh and Sky 2011). Consequently, the Sunnis felt marginalised from political 
processes. Al-Marashi (2005) further argues that the constitution making was 
extremely influenced by Shi’ites and Kurds. “The document was written under 
‘coerced consensus,’ with Arab Shi’a and Kurds, excluding Arab Sunni in the 
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drafting commission from crucial negotiations in the process and leaving many 
controversial and crucial issues unspecified for the sake of passing an upcoming 
referendum” (Ibid., p.2). Therefore, argued on the basis of the stated above, it is seen 
that marginalisation of Sunnis was evident during constitutional negotiations. 
Marginalisation results in inequality of participation during the constitution making 
processes. Equality, as argued in theory, is an important part of justice (Montada 
2001). Inequality resulting from marginalisation thus resulted in the Sunnis perception 
of the constitution making as unjust. Consequently, the Sunnis boycotted the 
constitution’s drafting process and later a majority of them voted ‘no’ in the October 
referendum, however, still the 2005 Iraqi constitution was upheld by a majority of 
votes. Sunnis believed to have been denied their rights to take part in drafting the 
constitution, which has implications for the future of Iraq. The Sunnis have 
consequently employed new tactics to protect themselves. Some have tried to grab 
their perceived share of power and ensure their survival through insurgency 
(Cetinsaya 2007). Therefore, their dissatisfaction with the constitution and political 
processes in Iraq and, later their actions, have played a major role in failing 
reconciliation processes.  
 
Chaplin (2006) argues that Article 7 of the Iraqi constitution also is seen by Sunnis as 
the article aimed to further marginalise them from political and economical benefits.  
“The new constitution proscribes racist or terrorist organisations, and 
specifically mentions ‘the Saddamist Ba’ath in Iraq and its symbols . . . who 
may not be part of the political pluralism in Iraq’ (Article 7), foreshadowing a 
law to regulate this. Given the composition of the Council of Representatives, 
the temptation will be to use this law to introduce new restrictions on former 
Ba’athists, accentuating existing divisions” (Chaplin 2006, p.280). 
 
The Sunnis were skeptical of the Article prescribing racists, terrorists and Saddamist 
Ba’ath. They believed this Article could be used as a mean to exclude them from 
political processes. Therefore, the Sunnis showed their highest sensitivity to it. Al-
Marashi (2005) also points to this Article and argues that the problem with Article 7 
was so severe that even Prime Minister Al-Maliki publicly admitted that the article 
had been an obstacle for Iraq reconciliation and recommended its amendment.  
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Against the backdrop of the issues considered above the majority of Sunnis rejected 
the referendum. “Referendum results, however, show that the majority of Sunni-
Arabs have rejected the NIC [New Iraqi Constitution]” (Cetinsaya 2007 p.63). “The 
Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% ‘no’ vote, respectively, 
but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh province only voted 55% ‘no,’ 
missing the threshold for a ‘no’ vote by a two-thirds majority in three provinces” 
(Katzman 2008). The majority of the Sunnis thus rejected the constitution. Part of the 
explanation behind such a major Sunni dissatisfaction with the constitution can be 
found in the marginalisation processes following the drafting of the constitutional 
negotiations, the constitution itself and its disfavoring Articles concerning Sunni 
interests, and the perceived major gains of Kurds and Shi’ites. Despite the Sunnis 
rejection of the referendum, the constitution was upheld. This was perceived as 
another marginalising act as stated by for instance Katzman (2008) and Cetinsaya 
(2007). Ultimately, they suggest that such marginalisation of the Sunnis could result 
in civil war. Based on their interpretation, this marginalisation of the Sunnis effected 
the reconciliation processes negatively.  
 
4.3 Arab Shia Muslims 
History 
The history and shared memory of being repressed under an authoritarian regime 
became an important factor in determining the Shi’ite position in the constitutional 
negotiation (Chaplin 2006). As the three main Shia parties - ISCI,  Sadr, and Da’wa - 
together with other minor Shia parties in the political coalition, the UIA had majority 
in the National Assembly, they came to occupy the majority of seats in the 
Constitutional Commission. The composition of this was assembled proportionality to 
the amount of seats in the national assembly. However, the three main coalition 
partners were not in full agreement of what the foundation for the ‘new Iraq’ should 
be. ISCI had a strong emphasis on being Shia and consequently favoured federalism, 
as this would serve as a safeguard, ensuring that an ethnic or religious group would 
not be repressed, as the Shia population during the Ba’ath regime (Schmidt 2008). 
Sadr and Da’wa, on the other hand, emphasised the Iraqi nationality and favoured a 
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more centralised united Iraq (McGarry and O’Leary 2007). As the ISCI was the 
largest member of the coalition and furthermore succeeded in joining forces with the 
Kurdish parties, that similarly favoured federalism, this became the founding 
principle for the constitution.  
However, despite differences among the Shia parties there was a general consensus 
among them that religion should be part of the constitution. And that it became. In the 
2005 constitution, it is stated that no man-made law can contradict the holy laws. 
However, 
“[m]any Shia, with memories of the brutal suppression of their religious rights 
by the Ba’athist regime, were determined to entrench these, while ensuring 
that Islam enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the new constitution. … But they 
were equally determined that Iraq should not fall under any form of Islamic 
fundamentalist rule as represented in the theocratic doctrine of Veleyat Al-
Faqih in neighbouring Iran.” (Chaplin 2006 p. 275). 
 
As a result of this, the Iraqi conclusion enables a secular approach, while on the other 
hand, not excluding Islam as the state religion, and the divine laws is still seen as 
mandatory. “The Dawa party vision is not clerical rule; it allows for lay leadership. 
But it does see Islamic law as important in being the law of the land, and the 
parliament — or the Consultative Council, the Shura Council - really would be 
reduced to passing regulations that went beyond the holy law in some respects but 
could never contradict it.” (Cole, Katzman, Sadjadpour, Takeyh 2005). This was the 
vision of the Da’wa party, a vision that they were very successful in implementing. 
Arguably, religion played a big part in creating a constitution which the Shia would 
perceive as just. 
 
Equality 
a. Distribution 
In the constitution Article 111 and 112 are dealing with the issue of distribution of oil. 
These articles account for fair distribution of oil to all Iraqis. However, if the Shi’ites 
form a federal entity they can gain all or most of the Iraqi oil share in their regions. In 
regards to the distribution of resources, which in the context of Iraq is mainly oil, 
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“[t]he Shi’a and Kurdish factions are united on the issue that they should profit from 
Iraq’s oil resources” (al-Marashi 2005 p.13). 
Although the Shia group can agree they deserve a fair share of the oil revenues, based 
on the claim that during the Ba’ath regime, they had been deprived of what was 
rightfully theirs (Schmidt 2008). However, the thought that oil resources should be 
controlled and distributed by regional powers caused for debate among the Shia 
parties, as some feared that such a system would create opportunity for deprivation of 
oil revenue for the regions without oil (Schmidt 2008). These regions are already 
populated by some of the poorest people of Iraq, which consist of both Sunnis and 
Shi’ites. 
On the basis of this, it can be argued that the Shi’ites (and Kurds) gained more from 
the constitution in regards to distribution of resources, and in particular the oil 
revenue, than the Sunni minority. Such a distribution could be seen as unequal. 
According to the theory of justice above, the distribution of resources should be on 
equal basis and mostly aimed at the most disadvantaged in the society (Montada 
2001). However, all three ethno-religious groups claim to be the most disadvantaged 
in Iraq, while Shi’ites and Kurds argue they were deprived of oil revenues during 
Ba’ath and Sunnis claim they are part of Iraq and thus deserve an equal share of the 
revenue. 
               
b. Representation 
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Shi’ite population could participate in the 
political sphere after decades of suppression (Chaplin 2006 and Cole, Katzman, 
Sadjadpour, and Takeyh 2005). Many Shi’ites felt that it was their turn. Even though 
there were some internal disputes among the different Shia groupings, they still 
managed to cooperate in order to maintain a majority of seats in the national 
assembly, reflecting their majority of the general population of Iraq. When drafting 
the constitution, the UIA coalition cooperated a great deal with the Kurdish 
representatives (Chaplin 2006 and al-Marashi 2005), as many of their goals could be 
achieved using the same tools that could be incorporated into the constitution. 
However, this was not well received by the Sunni population who had boycotted the 
elections, and therefore was underrepresented in the national assembly. They felt that 
the Shia and Kurdish had taken advantage of this, creating an uneven and unjust 
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situation. As argued in the theory section, equality can be perceived as an indicator of 
what is just or unjust (Montada 2001). It can thus be argued that the representation of 
Shi’ites and Kurds and the underrepresentation of Sunnis indicate an unequal ground 
that has affected the different ethno-religious groups’ perception. The 
overrepresentation of Shi’ites has had negative effects on Sunnis understanding of 
what has been just or unjust. However, the Shi'ites did not feel this way, as they felt, 
that they deserved to be well represented. 
 
c. Marginalisation 
As described above, there were internal disputes among the Shia political parties on 
whether they wanted a centralised government or a decentralised, federal system of 
government. However, as time progressed the majority favoured a federal system. 
“[T]he Shi'a also became fervent federalists, much to the annoyance of Sunnis.” 
(Stansfield 2005). Many of the UIA leaders stated their support of the creation of a 
federal Iraq which was to be created by the constitution. “...Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of 
the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution In Iraq and Iraq's National security 
Advisor, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie of Da'wa, both declared support for federalism and the 
creation of a southern Shi'a dominated province.” (Stansfield 2005). By doing so, they 
believed that they would create a system in which repression and marginalisation of 
any group in Iraq would become impossible to impose through law, as the regional 
governments could stop such a thing from happening. They also created a system in 
which the role of religion would somewhat be left for each region to decide as well. 
And last, but not least important, they created a system which would be approved by 
the assembly, as the Kurdish representatives also backed the idea of a federal Iraq. 
However, it was not all Shi’ites parties that approved the new system, some “...Shi'a 
groups also object to federalism, most notably the Virtue Party - a powerful splinter of 
the Sadr Movement - whose MPs walked out of the National Assembly” (Stansfield 
2005). Fearing that the constitution would become a tool used for marginalisation and 
suppression, the Shi’ites left a lot of room for interpretation to the regional powers 
which they had created. 
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4.4 Kurds 
History 
As seen in the context chapter above, the Kurds of Iraq have a history and shared 
memory of being repressed and marginalised by a centralised Arab Baghdadi regime - 
displaying an Arab identity they, as ethnic Kurds, felt alien too. This has had strong 
implications for their role in the crafting of the Iraqi constitution of 2005. It will be 
argued that the Kurds’ role in the constitutional negotiations can be interpreted as an 
attempt to restore justice (from their perspective) - justice, which was broken during 
the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party. Furthermore, the demands 
and requests the Kurds brought to the negotiation table was to a high extent shaped 
and framed by the shared Kurdish memory of being a repressed minority under an 
authoritarian centralised regime (Stansfield and Anderson 2009, p. 143 and Rogg and 
Rimscha 2007).   
This shared memory of marginalisation and repression in large parts of the Iraqi 
population, but maybe in particular the Kurdish groups, have produced “...a mindset 
which insists, not so much on revenge (although that instinct has also been marked), 
as on an absolute determination to secure once and for all those rights denied so 
long…” (Chaplin 2006, p. 273 [emphasis not in original]). The Kurds of Iraq, despite 
their internal differences and diverging political ideologies, managed to use the 
negotiating and drafting of the 2005 Iraqi constitution as a mean to ensure a number 
of the ‘rights’ they had been denied during the regime of Saddam Hussein (Barkey 
and Laipson 2005). Therefore, it can be argued that the memory (or history) of being 
a repressed and marginalised minority had direct implications for the role taken by the 
Kurds in the constitutional negotiations.  
 
Furthermore, this could be seen in the the absolute strongest constitutional demand 
from the Iraqi Kurds, which centered around the matter of federalism. The strong 
quest for “..federalism with strong powers to the regional constituent provinces” 
(Barkey and Laipson 2005, p. 66), as opposed to a centralised Baghdadi rule, was 
made against the backdrop of several issues and must thus be understood in relation to 
these. First, the shared Kurdish memory of being repressed played a huge impact in 
the demand for the ‘new Iraq’ to be framed by federalism. No new central power 
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should be able to exploit and repress the Kurds again, therefore federalism with strong 
self-ruled regional provinces, was seen as a protection against such evils.  
However, the Kurdish aspiration for independence is also crucial in this aspect. 
“Pressure for a high degree of devolution in the new constitution..., consolidating and, 
...expanding the autonomous status they [the Kurds] have enjoyed... since 1991. For 
many of them, the demise of Saddam Hussein is a golden opportunity to reassert 
Kurdish claims for an independent state.” (Chaplin 2006, p. 276). Federalism 
established in the constitution would allow the Kurds, and also the Shi’ite UIA 
coalition, the strong autonomous regional provinces they both favoured. However, al-
Marashi argues, the former claims for an independent Kurdish state, in the 
constitutional negotiations  were used merely as a negotiating tool (2005, p. 7). 
Nonetheless, an unofficial poll among the Kurds in 2005 showed that 95% of the 
population favoured an independent Kurdish state (Barkey and Laipson 2005, p. 69). 
Despite the unofficial nature and different irregularities in the poll, it still sent out a 
strong signal to the rest of Iraq that independence could be the ultimate outcome if 
admissions were not given to the Kurds in the constitutional negotiations (Rogg and 
Rimscha 2007, p. 833).     
 
A final issue, considering how the Kurdish history and memory have influenced the 
role of the Kurds in the constitutional negotiations, can be seen in the issue of 
identity. The Kurds managed to negotiate a compromise in Article 3, which made it 
clear that Iraq by no means is an ethnic Arab country (al-Marashi 2005, p. 17). Al-
Marashi provides a different translation of the Article into English that captures the 
Kurdish impact on Article 3 better than the standard translation: Iraq is a multitude of 
nations, multi-religious and multi-sect country. It is part of the Islamic world and 
Arab people in it are part of the greater Arab Nation. (Ibid.). Due to the marginalised 
past of the Kurds in Iraq, and the Iraqi narrative created by Saddam Hussein’s regime 
(being an Iraqi was to be an Sunni Arab), the identity as Kurds became increasingly 
important and was demanded into the constitution (Haddad 2013, p. 120).  
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Equality 
a. Distribution 
Chaplin argues that the Kurdish demand for federalism and thus a federal Iraq, 
“...fundamentally [was] about the control of natural resources.” (2006, p. 276). 
Distribution, and in particular the distribution of Iraq’s oil and gas resources, was of 
core importance behind the Kurdish demand for federalism to be written into the 
constitution. This would allow for a strong control over the extraction and distribution 
of oil and gas, and thus provide an economic basis for the Kurdish provinces 
(Stansfield and Anderson 2009). As argued further above, in the social domain of 
distribution, the main idea of justice is very strongly bound up with equality (Montada 
2001). The past experiences of repression from a centralised Baghdadi regime, have 
led the Kurds to take steps to guard themselves from that to happen again. The 
demand for autonomy and strong self-rule in the provinces with strong occurrences of 
oil and gas, can, according to Stansfield and Anderson, be understood in this context 
(2009, p. 143). This demand became very strong for the Kurds. Stansfield and 
Anderson further argue that, neither Kurdish politicians nor public voters ever would 
have supported the compromise on the constitution, without the Kurds receiving a fair 
share of the Iraqi oil and gas resources (Ibid.).  
 
The constitutional provisions dealing with Iraq’s rich oil and gas resources ended up 
being so conflicting and contradictory that discussions about who is entitled to what 
and how, were very complex to solve based on the constitutional provisions (Chaplin 
2006 and Stansfield and Anderson 2009). Articles 110, 111, 112, 115, and 121 are of 
importance here. Article 110 lists the exclusive powers of the federal state - oil and 
gas resources are not mentioned here. “Although article 111 confirms that oil and gas 
resources are owned by all the people of Iraq, Article 112 is much less clear-cut on 
the distribution of oil and gas revenues” (Chaplin 2006, p. 277). Article 112 claims 
that both the federal government and the producing provinces’ governments are 
responsible for the management of the present fields “...provided that it distributes oil 
and gas revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all 
parts of the country.” (Ibid.). However, it is unclear what will be happening with 
future fields. Article 115 and in particular Article 121 favours the regions more than 
the federal government. “This [Article 121] provides that where there is a 
45	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contradiction between regional and national legislation in any matter not reserved 
exclusively to the federal government, ‘the regional authority shall have the right to 
amend the application of the national legislation within that region’.” (Ibid.). 
Consequently, Article 121 of the Iraqi constitution can thus be applied by the Kurds to 
trump the federal laws with their own regional oil and gas laws (Stansfield and 
Anderson 2009, p. 141). 
 
b. Representation 
Despite the arguments above of historical, distributional, and economic motivation 
behind the demand for federalism, the role of identity - the Kurdish identity - in the 
constitutional negotiation must not be neglected. Barkey and Laipson (2005) and al-
Marashi (2005, p. 17) argue how demands for recognition of Kurdish as an official 
language were made, together with opposition against viewing Iraq as an Arab state 
or part of a greater Arab Nation. The protection and guarding of the Kurdish identity 
also stood as strong demands in the negotiation process.    
 
The impact of the Kurdish demands to the constitutional process bore good fruit, and 
the Kurds, despite being an ethnic minority, came to influence the final constitution 
substantially. This influence came about with hard work and circumstances favoured 
their efforts. Barkey and Laipson note, “[t]heir role in advocating for federalism and 
other issues particular to their minority status and interests had an even larger effect, 
given the very limited participation by Sunnis in the constitutional drafting process.” 
(2005, p. 66). The Sunni withdrawal from the negotiations, as mentioned above, 
proved a window of opportunity for the Kurds to influence the constitutional 
negotiations to a relatively high extent. They became an important negotiation partner 
for the Shia UIA coalition, however, “...some commentators [came] to consider the 
2005 constitution to be a document that reflects the political realities of the immediate 
post-invasion period… “ (Stansfield and Anderson 2009, p. 142). Iraq was 
‘reconstructed democratically’, argue Stansfield and Anderson (2009), in a manner 
that was deemed the best possible way for the two blocs. 
 
In the final constitution passed by referendum in January 2005 the Kurds were, due to 
the current (for them) favorable political power balance, favoured in certain areas 
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that, as the above has outlined, was of crucial importance to them. The most important 
issues were the implementation of “..federalism with strong powers to the regional 
constituent provinces” (Barkey and Laipson 2005, p. 66). The Kurds remained their 
autonomous provinces and regional self-ruling governments. Further, the 
constitutional provision of devices like the so-called ‘Kurdish veto’ also can be seen 
as accommodating Kurdish demands. This implies a  “...constitutional revisions to be 
rejected by a two-thirds majority vote in three or more provinces - giving the Kurds 
the clear ability to prevent the implementation of any revision considered threatening 
to their interests.” (Stansfield and Anderson 2009, p. 141). This can be seen as a 
device for protecting Kurdish interest, threatened by a possible future centralised 
Baghdadi government. 
 
Despite the Kurds’ efforts in many areas was accommodated, the Kurds did not 
perceive the 2005 constitution as fully satisfactory to their demands. “Rather, they see 
it as a compromise by them undertaken for the interest of the ‘new Iraq’ and evidence 
of their commitment to the integrity of the state.” (Stansfield and Anderson 2009, p. 
142).  The Kurdish interpretation of the constitution as favouring the ‘interest of the 
new Iraq’ is perceived differently by for instance Sunni Arab Iraqis, that ultimately 
boycotted the entire drafting and negotiating process as they felt threatened of being 
marginalised and excluded from Iraq’s rich oil and gas resources (Chaplin 2006, p. 
276). Despite the late addition of what now is Article 1, which “...stipulates that the 
constitution ‘is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq’” (Ibid., p. 277), the Sunnis still feel 
“...the Kurd’s actions illustrate that their ultimate aim is to secede from the state and 
that the constitution is merely a convenient means to achieve this.” (Stansfield and 
Anderson 2009, p. 141).    
Barkey and Laipson argue that “...the Kurds were too successful in their negotiations 
and have now stimulated deep anxieties in the other communities about federalism 
and the future of the state.” (2005, p. 67). Further they worry that “...the approval of 
the constitution on October 15 may someday be seen as the Kurds’ pyrrhic victory.” 
(Ibid.).  
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c. Marginalisation 
Especially during the years under Saddam Hussein's Ba’ath regime the Kurds 
experienced systematic repression and violent attacks merely on the basis of being 
Kurdish (Rogg and Rimscha 2007). This shared memory of marginalisation and 
repression for the Kurdish groups, have produced “...a mindset which insists...to 
secure once and for all those rights denied so long…” (Chaplin 2006, p. 273). The 
past marginalisation of the Kurds has thus produced a drive towards ensuring many of 
those ‘rights’ they had been denied during the repressive decades under the rule of the 
Ba’ath regime. (Barkey and Laipson 2005).  
These Kurdish ‘rights’ - or rather demands to the new constitution - can thus be seen 
as a way in which the Kurds sought to restore justice - a perception of justice that in 
the perspective of the Kurds had been severely violated during the reign of Saddam 
Hussein. The “...basically subjective nature of judgments of justice and injustice...”, 
argued by Mikula (2001, p. 8063) previously, can thus be detected in the Kurdish 
demands for the new constitution.   
 
4.5 Sub-conclusion 
Based on the analysis above, it can be argued that the Sunnis have perceived the 
constitutional negotiations as well as the final constitution as unjust. The most 
important theme that affected the Sunnis perception of this was equality - 
marginalisation, distribution and representation respectively. The Sunnis have 
perceived the processes of the constitution making as unjust, as they have been 
subject to marginalisation and have lacked representation. As a result, the Sunnis have 
become vulnerable to deprivation of oil resources. Marginalisation in the case of the 
Sunnis has created mistrust between Sunnis and the other ethno-religious groups. 
Further, it has created an uncertainty about the future and has raised Sunni skepticism 
towards every political decision during the making of the constitution. The Sunni 
perceptions of the constitution being fundamentally unjust, based on inequality during 
the making of the constitution, have affected reconciliation processes negatively in 
the country. 
The analysis of the different Shi’ite groups perception of justice during the 
negotiations of the Iraqi constitution show that after decades of oppression, the Shia 
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feel like they have a chance to achieve a just place in society. Despite the Shi'ites 
being divided into factions, they have still managed to stand as a somewhat united 
group, in order to achieve what they saw as the best or rightful solutions. However, in 
this process they managed to distance themselves from the Sunni minority, as they 
felt the Shi’ites had overplayed their new dominant position in Iraq's political sphere. 
The analysis of the case of the Kurds and their perception of justice in the making of 
the 2005 constitution has shown, that the Kurds ultimately have used the 
constitutional negotiations to ‘restore justice’ or rather to regain some of these ‘rights’ 
they feel they during the Ba’ath regime had been denied. Further, it has been argued, 
that the role of the Kurds on the basis of their perception of justice in the 
constitutional negotiations might have been ‘too successful’ in the negotiations, 
jeapordising national reconciliation processes.  
 
Chapter 5 - Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is a discussion of our findings in 
regards to the theoretical framework put forth by Llewellyn and Philpott (2014), 
which is presented in chapter 2. The second part discusses the transition from 
authoritarian to democracy and the role of the international community - namely, US-
led coalition, UN and exile Iraqis after 2003 in Iraq.  
 
5.2 Discussion of findings  
As it has been shown in the previous chapter, the ethno-religious groups’ perception 
of justice has affected the process of constitution making and ultimately also the 
national reconciliation processes. It has generally had negative implications for the 
national reconciliation processes, as for instance is seen in the Sunnis perception of 
themselves as being left in a marginalised position, politically underrepresented and a 
victim of inequalities. This stands in contrast to Lederach’s (1997) argument that 
countries coming out of civil war - or as we argue a similar crisis - needs relational 
restoration. As the analysis of the constitutional negotiations have shown, such 
relational restoration have not take place in Iraq, leaving room for a further 
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escalation of the inter-group tensions. Something the current situation of Iraq shows 
clear signs of.  
A further example of the mistrust and unrestored inter-group relationships can be 
exemplified in the two failed reconciliation initiatives of 2005 and 2006 respectively. 
The reconciliation initiative proposed by the Arab League, was, as stated in chapter 1, 
perceived to favour the Sunni interests by the Shia majority and the Kurdish minority. 
On this basis, the reconciliation initiative was rejected (Al-Marashi and Keskin 2008 
p.250-253). Similarly, the reconciliation initiative by al-Maliki’s predominantly Shia 
dominated government was rejected as being too pro-Shia by the Sunni minority in 
Iraq (Ibid. p.253-256). Rejections deriving from the unrestored relations and 
corresponding mistrust. Ethno-religious identity became important on the expense of 
the national identity, which created even further mistrust and fragmentation.   
Considering this in regards to the theoretical framework suggested by Llewellyn and 
Philpott (2014), it therefore seems that the work done on the constitution, with the 
constitution seen as a tool or foundation for reconciliation, did not achieve its goal of 
creation an equal, and therefore just, relationship between the three ethno-religious 
groups. It rather shifted the balance of the relationship from one side to the other. For 
instance, the first committee created for drafting a constitution, preceding the 
Constitutional Commission, was made proportional to the amount of seats won in the 
national assembly, which the Sunni had boycotted the elections for. Regardless of 
this, the committee proceeded in the process of creating a constitution.  
Having one of the ethno-religious group underrepresented, or as in this case hardly 
represented at all, can be seen as an unequal or unjust relationship. For the sake of 
national reconciliation this has negative implications. As argued above, a country 
coming out of a civil war, or related situations, is in need of both material and 
relational restoration (Lederach 1997). Thus, unequal relations embedded in the 
constitution, a fundamental democratic foundation, is a clear hindrance for relational 
restoration and ethno-religious reconciliation, ranging through different levels, from 
the individual and communal, to the national. Additionally, as indicated in the 
previous chapter, the constitution itself can be interpreted in various ways, and 
therefore, it can be interpreted depending on which goals you are trying to achieve. 
This creates the potential for the constitution to be a foundation for future conflict, 
rather than a tool used to pre-emptively solve them. The reason for such ambiguity 
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in the constitution can to some extent be found in the processes of negotiations, and 
the hostile relationship between the different ethno-religious groups. 
 
Throughout this project it has been argued that all three ethno-religious groups in Iraq 
have considered themselves treated unjust in the past, or fear they will be treated 
unjust in the future. The constitutional negotiations and the final constitution have 
further emphasised the lack of social equality and unrestored relationship between the 
ethno-religious groups. Against this backdrop Llewellyn and Philpott’s (2014) earlier 
introduced framework of a relational approach to reconciliation and peacebuilding 
can provide insights to a way forward for Iraq. The framework has great emphasis on 
equality and relationships in regards to peacebuilding. at the centre of this approach is 
the restoration of relationships on all levels of society - something that in the 
aftermath of the 2003-regime change was not paid enough attention to. Llewellyn and 
Philpott (2014) provide four reason for the benefits of this relational framework for 
reconciliation: 1) The relational approach is capable of incorporating human rights. 
This can be used for identifying injustices. 2) The relational approach seeks to 
languish the borders between the the public and private sphere and the personal and 
political. This creates a foundation for transparency, which is a key for sustainable 
stability in a society. 3) This approach includes accountability for wrongdoers. 
However, it rejects the idea of persecution for the sake of persecution, and by that 
rejecting the focus on individuals that such an approach implies. 4) Viewing 
peacebuilding from the perspective of this framework, gives peacebuilding a different 
timeframe as well. In this framework there is no “static end point” as we are dealing 
with relationships. This is contrary to the ideas of retributive justice, whereas justice 
and equality has been reached when the perpetrator(s) has been prosecuted and 
punished (Llewellyn and Philpott 2014, p.30-32). 
In the case of Iraq, especially evident in the analysis of the case of the Kurds and 
Shias, the driving force in the negotiations was to a large extent the objective of 
restoring lost rights - or at least rights they had been deprived of during the rule of 
Saddam Hussein. This created an environment around the negotiations where the 
groups sought to maximise their own agenda, which ultimately disfavoured the others. 
Thus seen in the light of Llewellyn and Philpott’s (2014) framework for 
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reconciliation, a completely different approach should have been taken in the Iraqi 
context.    
 
In addition, Llewellyn and Philpott (2014, p.33-34) presents certain factors which 
influence the outcome of a reconciliation process. One of these is the presence or 
absence of international actors. In the case of Iraq, it is safe to say that, there have 
been a heavy presence of international actors. Following will account for the 
implications of this.  
 
5.3 Discussion of International interference 
This section discusses international interference as another factor that could have 
affected national reconciliation processes in Iraq. Our findings in the analytical 
chapter show that Iraqi national history has played a major role in shaping the current 
situation in the country. The authoritarian regime in Iraq before a period of relative 
democracy affected the Iraqis on different levels. However, it is also important to 
understand the developments during the so called democratic process in the country 
after 2003. Therefore, the US led invasion of Iraq and the new political sphere created 
by it, are also of great importance.  
 
Authors like Sarkin and Sensibaugh (2009) and Haddad (2013) claim that historically, 
Iraq has never been in such fragile situation as this present one, and this despite the 
three main ethno-religious groups fighting each other existed in the past as well. 
Therefore, it can be argued, the 2003 international intervention in the country that 
entailed a huge wave of new, modern and to some extent different ideologies, 
incitements and conventions, have played an important role. Undoubtedly, the US-led 
invasion of Iraq and tackling of Saddam Hussein, had its implications on the country. 
Ethno-religious groups in Iraq have never enjoyed complete social and political 
cohesion, however, the extreme hostility, which currently is evident has neither been 
the general norm either (Sarkin and Sensibaugh 2009, Haddad 2013). One of the main 
reasons for the current high degree of hostility between the groups can be argued to be 
the top-down transition from dictatorship to democracy, facilitated - or maybe rather 
imposed - by the international community. This matter will be discussed below to 
52	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
further evaluate our findings and discuss them in lights of other theories that could 
challenge our findings. 
 
“Cohesion in … democracy depends… on … consistent commitment to general 
values of any sort and on the ‘pragmatic acceptance’ by subordinate classes of their 
limited roles in society” (Mann 1970 p.423). Social and political cohesions are one of 
the important characteristics of democratic societies. They form the foundation for 
stable democracies where consolidation of plurality is of significant importance 
(Cuellar 2009). Iraq witnessed the extensive period of democratisation after 2003 US 
invasion of the country. The country was now being ruled under different standards 
than before - namely, elections and national and internationally accepted 
governments. Since 2003, the monopoly of power by one ethnicity was being 
challenged. The Iraqis after 2003 had to form coalition government under supervision 
of international advisors, unlike the Ba’athist rule, where only Arab nationalistic 
characters had part or influenced in political matters. This transition affected the 
different aspects of Iraq, from political decision making to social tolerance, people 
who were kept separated from each other for years, now had to make collective 
decisions. This plurality and cohesion could have created collision of values, interests 
and goals, which could have affect reconciliation process in the country and escalate 
tensions. 
 
Other than this, the armed conflict and unrest that have escalated in Iraq and the 
reasons that the country in 2006-7 experienced a civil war could be in opportunities 
provided by the emerging democratic processes in the country. Gleditsch (2010) 
argues that civil wars and political and social unrest could be caused by I. social and 
economic grievances, II. Conditions that help mobilization amongst different groups 
and also III. The notion of political opportunity structures. 
Grievances of oppression under the Ba’ath regime and after the 2003 intervention 
existed in Iraq and some of which have already been discussed in this project. 
However, the transition in 2003 created a security vacuum in different parts of the 
country that facilitated the appropriate condition of insurgents’ mobilisation. The 
limited number of international coalition forces led by US in the country and the 
dissolvent of previous regimes security forces left many areas of Iraq insecure and 
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vulnerable (Cetinsaya 2006). This security vacuum created an ideal condition for 
terrorist and anti-government groups to form insurgent factions in the country. 
Religiously motivated hatred against Western troops was one of the main tools used 
by many terrorist organisations to gather fighters against the US-supported Baghdadi 
regime. Moreover, the transition created a new political structure that opened new 
opportunities for different ethno-religious groups in Iraq. Consequently, the political 
structure in Iraq could be another reason why reconciliation in the country failed. 
Many other factors, different from the Iraqis perception of justice in current social 
developments, ultimately, also could have affect the failure of national reconciliation. 
In order to be able to analyse all these different factors, broader research strategies 
along with resources are needed, which during this research was not available.  
 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion and Perspectivation  
6.1 Conclusion 
This conclusion will be presented in two parts. First, a general conclusion of the 
project that sums up the answer(s) to this study’s research question. The second part 
will further entail specific accounts concluding on each of the three ethno-religious 
groups – namely, the Sunnis, the Shi’ites and the Kurds. 
 
General Conclusion 
On the basis of the interpretation of the empirical literature that has been analysed in 
this study, it can be concluded that in regards to justice the ethno-religious groups of 
Iraq have perceived the constitutional negotiation processes differently. Further, in 
general terms the different groups’ sentiment of being treated unjust (in political, 
social and economic matters), as exemplified by the process of making the 
constitution, has negative implications for national reconciliation processes. The 
sentiment or perception of being treated unjust is thus another factor that has 
negatively affected the national reconciliation processes in Iraq. 
Concluding on the different ethno-religious groups’ perception of the constitution 
making as just or unjust has certain complications and challenges. These 
complications are centred around the interconnectedness of the groups, the different 
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analytical themes, and the influence of different other factors. Focusing on one theme 
and how that has affected the perception is simplifying matters, as the themes are 
interconnected and dependent on each other.  Moreover, the second part of the 
research question, detecting the extent of the perceptions have influenced national 
reconciliation processes, is similarly complicated. A number of different factors and 
themes, such as for instance, international influence and regional politics, could also 
affect the processes. Ultimately, it is important to keep in mind that the answers in 
this conclusion are limited to framework of this study. Subsequently, the study is not 
able to make any general conclusions, but merely conclusions on the cases on the 
basis of the framework and limits of the empirical literature applied here.   
 
The Iraqi constitution is seen as a ground for power struggles between the three main 
ethno-religious groups in Iraq and that has affected the national reconciliation 
processes negatively. The power struggles during the making of the constitution, 
mainly the negotiations and drafting processes, illustrated fears of the past and ideas 
about the future for all three ethno-religious groups. The power struggle further draws 
traces back to treatment of the Shi’ites and the Kurds during the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, and has implications for the treatment of the Sunnis post-2003 US-led 
invasion. Based on the analysis it can thus be concluded that even though the Kurds 
gained the most from the constitutional negotiations, still believed to have 
compromised a lot for the sake of the ‘new Iraq’. The Sunnis, however, felt highly 
marginalised in the negotiations and therefore started to perceive themselves to be the 
new oppressed minority in the country. A sense of being treated unjust predominated. 
For the Shi’ites, on the other hand, contemplations of the constitution are divided. A 
majority of the Shi’ites believe they have gained what they wanted from the 
negotiations, however, the remaining groups had different objectives. 
 
The high level of oppression aimed at Kurds and Shi’ites under Saddam Hussein’s 
regime had led to the build up of an environment of mistrust between the three ethno-
religious groups in the country. Moreover, the uncertainty of Sunni Arabs for their 
future based on their sentiment about other groups’ power gains have negatively 
affected the way the three ethno-religious groups perceive the developments during 
the constitution making. The Sunnis felt mistreated by Iraqi Shi’ite dominated 
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government because of the de-Ba’athification programme. Consequently, that resulted 
them being misrepresented during the constitutional negotiation processes, which 
further enhanced the perception of the making of the constitution as unjust. This had 
consequences for many Sunnis as they felt their future security was threatened. 
Therefore, identity became important - religious and ethnic identity. Protection of 
sectarian identity thus became a priority, which for instance resulted in the formation 
formation of several insurgent groups motivated by ethnicity and religion. Likewise, 
one of the unsatisfied Shi’ite groups - the Sadrists - who were perusing for a 
centralised power in the constitution, gathered under the umbrella of Shi’ite militia 
fighters led by Muqtada al-Sadr. On the other hand, the gains of Kurds from the 
constitution have created strong apprehensions in other groups. These reactions have 
deepened the wounds of the already divided Iraqi society that became major obstacles 
for reconciliation processes in the coming years. 
The following sections will account more specifically for the analytical conclusions 
made on each of the three ethno-religious groups.  
 
The Sunnis 
Based on our analysis and findings, it can be concluded that the Sunnis generally 
perceived the constitutional making processes as unjust. The reason for the perception 
of injustice was related to several factors. Firstly, the Sunnis believed they were 
underrepresented during the constitutional negotiation process. Secondly, they were 
subject to an extreme harsh de-Ba’athification programme and thus marginalised from 
the political processes. Consequently, some of the constitutional articles were 
interpreted as against their future interests. Therefore, many of the Sunnis formed or 
joined insurgent groups and anti-government movements that increased the division 
amongst the Iraqi ethno-religious groups. These are considered as a major obstacle to 
reconciliation process in the country, and ultimately were  part of the reasons why the 
country was thrown into a bloody civil war in 2006/7.   
 
The Shi’ites 
During the constitutional negotiations the Shi’ites endeavoured to gain the maximum 
from constitution to secure their future. This was for two reasons, the memory of the 
past experiences of the Ba’ath regime’s suppression and the fear of future. Such an 
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endeavour and the gains from the constitution have further increased hostility to the 
Sunnis, but they have managed a better relation with Kurds. Their gains along with 
the Kurds increased the Sunnis dissatisfaction from the constitution that effected the 
reconciliation processes negatively. 
 
The Kurds 
The making of the constitution, can be argued to be an attempt of the Kurds to restore 
justice and regain their rights, which the Ba’ath regime deprived them of. They also 
wanted to obtain the largest share in the future of Iraq. Concluding on the analysis, the 
Kurds have gained the most out of the constitutional negotiations. Their replete gains 
contrary to what the Sunnis got, were acknowledged as a negative effect on 
reconciliation processes.  
 
Recapitulating on the basis of the body of empirical literature, the main conclusions 
of this study are that the different Iraqi ethno-religious groups perceived the matter of 
justice in the constitutional negotiation processes differently. However, especially the 
Sunni perception of the negotiation processes as being highly unjust, together with the 
fact that the Kurds and Shi’ites seemed to gain more from the negotiation than the 
Sunnis, resulted in a negative effect on the national reconciliation processes. The 
constitutional negotiations are, however, not solely to blame for the increased hostile 
sectarianism in Iraq, but as is argued in this study, it is an important factor and did 
have negative impacts for the national reconciliation processes.          
 
6.2 Perspectivation  
In the following section we will place our project in a broader academic context, and 
philosophise upon some of the theoretical and analytical choices we have made.  
As the world has become more globalised, conflicts around the world have become 
more relevant for all people, not just those who are directly a part of it. Therefore, 
conflict research has an increased importance.  
In this project we are building on the framework for peacebuilding, presented by 
Llewellyn and Philpott (2014). This framework builds on the ideas of reconciliation 
and relational justice. We use their framework as foundation and have added the 
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frame of how different perceptions of justice can influence the process of national 
reconciliation and the relationship between the different ethno-religious groups of 
Iraq. 
When such a framework is chosen, molded, and created, some choices are made on 
where to put the focus. These choices have the inevitable consequence, that we also 
choose where not to focus. 
Some of the topics which we touch upon, could be subjects for analysis by 
themselves. These are topics such as democracy, power, and oil. For instance, the 
distribution of oil revenue seems to have played a major role in the negotiations, and 
is among scholars regarded to as a topic with potential for future conflict among the 
ethno-religious groups of Iraq, as it has been a topic for past conflict. 
 
In our project we take a point of departure in the Iraqi perspective, when analysing the 
different ethno-religious groups represented in Iraq. For this we have been using 
secondary literature. Using secondary literature gave us a broad and diverse sample of 
data to interpret, however, this could have been supplemented by primary data. Had 
we supplemented our data with, for example, interviews or other fieldwork, we would 
have been able to add an additional layer to our analysis. 
In addition to this, we had a focus on the period in which the constitution was drafted, 
which, in our project, spans from the invasion by the US led coalition to referendum 
in 2005. However, reconciliation as a process is continually and has no static end 
point. Therefore, expanding the timeline would most likely yield some interesting 
findings. Exploring the aftermath of the constitution and the consequences of the 
choices made during the drafting and maybe if the failing attempts of reconciliation 
has had any influence on the state that Iraq currently is in.  
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